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Abstract 
Armenian-Iranian alignment in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of the 
fields in the International Relations that lack research and proper attention. Given the 
role of Iran both in regional and global terms and the geographical location of Armenia 
on the chessboard of interests of the international players, this is a topic that should be 
addressed properly. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran tried to establish 
diplomatic relations with newly independent South Caucasus Republics that included 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was 
accompanied by bloody conflicts. One of those conflicts was Nagorno-Karabakh over 
which Armenia and Azerbaijan were fighting and it was taking place right in the Iranian 
neighbourhood. Iran tried to take a position which would secure its borders and not 
present a threat to its national security.  
The general perception is that in NK conflict Iran is backing Armenia, a Christian 
country, instead of Azerbaijan-a Shia Muslim country. In order to understand the logic 
of Iranian foreign policy, a multi-dimensional analysis was made. The thesis 
approached the topic from the perspective of the Constructivist paradigm of alliance 
theory and compared/contrasted it with the Realist/Neorealist thinking. The analysis of 
the empirical part was based on the National Security Strategy Documents of the two 
states, research of local and foreign experts both in academic sources and media, and the 
conducted interviews with Armenian experts and diplomats. So, by applying the 
theoretical part to the empirical part, the thesis argues that the Constructivist theory is 
capable of addressing how Iranian national interests resulted in the alignment with the 
Armenia, while other approaches of alliance theory would have predicted something 
different.      
 
 
Keywords: Armenia, Iran, alignment, alliance theory, Constructivism, national 
interests, foreign policy, geopolitics, security, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
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Introduction 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 Iran started to develop diplomatic and 
economic relations with newly independent countries in its close vicinity, including 
Armenia. Even though Armenian-Iranian relations have seen much turbulence 
throughout the centuries, the new geopolitical setting has created conditions that 
directed the two states to develop a close relationship. In the centre of the research 
puzzle of my thesis stand Armenian-Iranian relations in the context of Nagorno-
Karabakh (NK) conflict. The research question is: “Why Iran has taken a strategic 
position that is in favour of Armenia in Karabakh conflict although alliance theory 
would have predicted something different”?   
The reasons why this topic presents a puzzle are several. In the first place, the field itself 
is not well researched and most of the scholars in International Relations do not pay as 
much attention to this region as it is required. Yet, even if there are a number of 
researchers who have investigated the framework of the Armenian-Iranian relations, 
several aspects are overlooked or the main focus of analysis is the ethnic, nationalistic 
dimension. This thesis has approached the issue from the Constructivist perspective in 
IR and contrasts it with the Realist/Neorealist type of alliance theory. I will try to argue 
that Constructivism explains Armenian-Iranian alignment better than the 
Realist/Neorealist position of alliance theory because in this particular case the 
construction of Iranian national interests plays much more essential role than the 
approaches offered by the other theories.  
The choice of the term alignment over alliance is a delicate matter that should be made 
clear from the very beginning. “Alignment” is a more general term that is used by 
scholars to define all kinds of collaborations which include the geostrategic, political 
and economic type of cooperation, they do not imply any kind of obligations towards 
the engaged parties and are not necessarily limited to military formations. Whereas the 
term “alliance” is used to define military cooperation and involved parties have certain 
obligations towards each other at the time of external threats. Therefore, the analysis of 
the empirical part will show that in the case of Armenian-Iranian relations it is more 
suitable to use the term “alignment” rather than “alliance”.       
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The Realist work on alliance theory is mainly based on the military endeavours. They 
argue that states will enter into this kind of alliance only if there is an external threat. 
For Realists, alliances have two central values: first, states form alliances because there 
is a common threat to national interests of everyone involved in this alliance. Second, as 
alliances are based on threats, it is especially difficult for an alliance to evolve unless all 
involved parties agree to respond to the new threat (Fearon 1997). Another approach of 
the Realists scholars is that stats sharing the same ideology, on the one hand, are 
inclined to alignment as they have the same kind of threat perception, on the other hand, 
this may put a serious division between them.    
Secondly, the Neorealist approach of alliance theory defines alliance as a set of mutual 
expectations between two or more states and they will have each others’ support in 
disputes or wars with particular other states. Such interests arise chiefly from commonly 
perceived reality depending perhaps on the parties’ relative degree of conflict with the 
same adversary. Therefore, they cannot be studied separately from the enmities and 
rivalries to which they respond.  Neorealist scholar G. Snyder states: “alliances are 
formal associations of states for the use of military force, intended for either the security 
or the aggrandisement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not 
these others are specifically identified” (Snyder, 2003).   
Finally, Constructivists argue that national interests and international system are both 
entirely socially constructed and they put the identity at the centre of alliance formation. 
Two important aspects that constructivists argue about the alliances are: first, states 
form alliances based on a perception that it is within national interest to do so. Second, 
alliances have the ability to form collective identities between their members 
(Finnemore, 1996).   
From the Realist/Neorealist perspective it would have been logical to assume Iran 
backing up Azerbaijani claims in the Karabakh conflict since both countries share 
Muslim solidarity and what is more- there are about twice as many Azeris living in the 
north-western part of Iran than is the Azeri population in Azerbaijan. Yet, there seem to 
be other factors supporting the Constructivist theory to explain alliance formation in 
different conditions.  
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Furthermore, the topic is of central value to the discipline of the International Relations, 
because it is important to understand what position Iran, as an important regional and 
global player, has in the conflict and how ideologically two completely different 
countries such as Armenia and Iran, found common grounds for such deep alignment 
and cooperation. Even though currently Iran is a less involved party in the process of 
NK negotiations (although it has suggested being a mediator in the conflict a number of 
times), the general perception is that it has been more supportive towards Armenia 
rather than Azerbaijan.  
In the meantime, it must be noted that the thesis does not aim to analyse the specifics of 
NK conflict or how it should be resolved.  The ethnic dimension of the conflict is not 
presented as well, as for understanding the Armenian-Iranian alignment it is not 
relevant.  
 
Research methodology  
The research methodology is based on the evaluation and contrast of the 
Realist/Neorealist and Constructivist analysis of alliance theory. As for the empirical 
part, Armenian and Iranian National Security Strategy documents, assessment of 
different experts in academic sources and media articles defining possible reasons for 
alignment have been studied. Additionally, interviews held with seven Armenian 
analysts and diplomats supported and complemented the findings of the all above-
mentioned sources. All in all, the key to resolving the research puzzle is the 
comparison/contrast of the Constructivist approach with the Realist/Neorealist alliance 
theory and analysed empirical evidence.   
One of the major problems of the research was the absence of sufficient official 
documents on foreign policy doctrines of Armenia and Iran. In other words, neither 
Armenia nor Iran has officially adopted foreign policy doctrines. Instead, both countries 
have National Security Strategy Documents accepted in 2007 and 2011/2 respectively. 
However, there are two issues that are needed to be taken into account. These 
documents are more general and present what are the tasks and priorities of the 
countries in a broader sense, not particularly focusing on foreign policy approach 
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towards one or the other country. Second, given that documents have been adopted ten 
and five years ago respectively, they are not quite up to date, especially, taken into 
account the recent geopolitical developments in the Middle East and South Caucasus. 
One of the experts during the interview mentioned that the reason why Armenia’s 
National Security Strategy Document has not been updated during the last ten years is 
the current geopolitical setting of the region when Armenia does not want to choose 
sides and prefers to develop equal relations with all the interested parties in the region. 
Nevertheless, the thorough analysis of local and foreign experts on Armenian-Iranian 
bilateral relations, their inter-relations with regional and non-regional global actors 
along with the media sources and interviews provided sufficient basis for creating the 
complete picture and substitute the possible gaps. 
 
Data and sources  
The key literature for the theoretical part is based on the research of Realist, Neorealist 
and Constructivist scholars such as Morrow, Fearon, Snyder, St. Walt, M. Barnett, 
Finnemore, and many others whose analysis is of central value for understanding the 
three mentioned concepts. For the empirical part, officially adopted National Security 
Strategy Documents of Armenia and Iran have been used, which gave the understanding 
of what are the state priorities on foreign policy issues. Along with the official 
documents on National Security Strategies, a number of articles and analysis on the 
foreign policy approaches of Iran and Armenia have been used in order to find the 
answer(s) to the research question. Additionally, even though the majority of the used 
literature is in English, I have had access to literature in Armenian, Russian, and Farsi, 
which let me observe the sources and materials in media of respective countries as well 
in order to substitute the gaps of missing official documents. Finally, during my 
research, I have been cooperating with Regional Studies Centre (RSC) and Caucasus 
Institute (CI) in Armenia, where I have had access to a significant amount of books, 
journals and articles published by local and foreign experts.  
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Thesis structure   
The first section of the thesis starts with defining the difference between alignments and 
alliances and which term is more suitable in our chosen case. Then it continues with the 
analysis of the Alliance theory from the Realist/Neorealist and Constructivist 
perspectives. The focus is on when and how alignments and/or alliances are formed and 
which factors contribute to these formations. The Realist/Neorealist balance of power 
and balance of threat approaches are analysed and contrasted with the Constructivist 
understanding of national interests’ formulation and their influence on the alignment 
patterns. 
The second part starts with presenting how National Security Strategy Documents, 
academic sources and interviews present the formulation of Armenia’s and Iran’s 
interests in terms of bilateral relations and which spheres of cooperation they include. 
The main question is which factors made ideologically such different countries like 
Armenia and Iran ally with each other, while Azerbaijan is a Muslim country and from 
the first sight sharing much more similarities with Iran does not have as strong 
alignment ties with the latter as Armenia.  
The third section gives the general overview of the NK conflict along with discussing 
Iranian involvement in the initial phase of the negotiations, and analyses how different 
factors according to the Armenian, Iranian and Russian media articles, academic 
sources and conducted interviews explain Iran’s position.  
Finally, the conclusion summarises the findings based on the discussed theoretical and 
empirical data. As a result, the thesis concludes how the Constructivist theory explains 
Armenian-Iranian alignment pattern, if it is an alignment, in contrast with the Realist 
and Neorealist approaches and why it was more beneficial for Iran to adopt a position 
that seems to be in favour of Armenia. 
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Part 1 
Alliance theory from the perspective of Realist, Neorealist and 
Constructivist approaches 
1.1 Alignment vs. alliance  
  Before discussing the alliance theory and the cooperation among states in International 
Relations, it is important to put a distinction between the terms “alignment” and 
“alliance” and see which one is more suitable to apply in our case.  It is important to 
note that even today there is still a lack of taxonomy among the scholars when it comes 
to the distinction between the two terms, as the scholarship has not always kept pace 
with the transformation of traditional alliances and the emergence of new alignment 
archetypes (Wilkins, 2012).  
  Glenn Snyder defines alliances as “... formal associations of states for use or (non-use) 
of military force, intended either for the security or the aggrandisement of their 
members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly 
identified” (Snyder, 2003).  Hans Morgenthau defines alliance as “a formal and mutual 
commitment to contribute military assistance in the event one of the alliance partners is 
attacked” (Morgenthau, 2005). St. Walt defines alliance as “a formal or informal 
arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” (Walt, 
1987). P. Weistman defines alliances as “bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide 
some elements of security to the signatories” (Weitsman, 2003). Robert Osgood defines 
alliance as a formal agreement that “guarantees states to cooperate in using their 
military resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of 
the signatories to use force or consider the use of force in specified circumstances” 
(Osgood, 1968).   
Alliances may be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral groupings of states designed for 
defensive or offensive military collaboration. Alliance theorists seem to agree on the 
issue that alliances are meant to counterbalance powerful states (Waltz, 2010) or ones 
perceived as threatening adversaries (Walt, 1997). Booth argues that the traditional and 
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still predominant approach of alliances is based on the balance of power consideration 
and once there is no threat the alliance dissolves (Booth, 1987).   
Alignments are defined differently. George Modelski classifies alignment as “all types 
of political cooperation” and alliances as “military collaboration” (Modelski, 1963). 
Snyder explains alignments as formations, where parties have a number of mutual 
expectations between two or more countries in case of disputes or wars with particular 
other states. Since alignments are mainly based on expectations during disputes, 
members are not required to act together all the time (Snyder, 2003). While alliances 
imply a certain level of commitment, alignments do not require that. S. Walt and S. 
David define alignment as cooperation between two or more states that includes mutual 
expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain 
conditions in the future (Miller, 2011).  
So, Snyder argues that “alignment” refers to “a broader and more fundamental term ... 
defined as expectations of states about whether they will be supported or opposed by 
other states in future interactions” (Snyder, 1997). Hence, an alliance is merely one 
form of alignment. Morgenthau claims that “not every community of interests, calling 
for common policies and actions also calls for legal codification in an explicit alliance” 
(Morgenthau, 2005). Consequently, alliance simply adds some formality to the relations 
between parties, while alignment is not signified by formal treaties, but is outlined by a 
variety of behavioural actions. While alliances include the military dimension of 
international politics, alignments do not solely focus on it and include a multifaceted 
sculpture of national and supranational postures. According to Ward, some of the 
theorists mistakenly use the terms alignment, alliance and coalition as equal to each 
other, while it should be highlighted that alignment is a covering concept for all the 
others (Ward, 1982).    
In the case of Armenia and Iran, it is better to use the term alignment as the author of 
this thesis shares the opinion of those theorists who see alignment as a broader concept 
which includes all types of political cooperation and mutual expectation of some degree 
of policy coordination on security issues.  The cooperation between Armenia and Iran, 
that has political, economic, cultural and other dimensions is not driven by external 
security threat, instead, there is another factor, such as state interests, that should be 
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taken into consideration. As it is in the case of alignments that they are not signified by 
formal treaties but are outlined by behavioural actions, the collaboration between 
Armenia and Iran also does not put legal obligations or limitations on parties in terms of 
cooperation with other states, even if there are certain expectations in case of security 
issues. In 2017 on the level of the Defence Ministers of the two countries the possibility 
of military cooperation has been discussed, yet at this point, it would be more precise to 
settle with the term alignment.   
 
1.2 Realist approach to the alliance theory 
Realist approach of the alliance theory has a central role in International Relations. 
Realists argue that the alliances are formed based on the military needs, and are created 
either for security reasons or the enhancement of their members against certain other 
states that present a potential threat. The main argument of Realism is that by entering 
into alliances states mainly try to respond the threats from the external environment.  
George Liska highlights the fact that it is impossible to speak of international relations 
without referring to alliances. Throughout the history, it has been proven that the basic 
reason for countries to form alliances is either to secure their existence or to keep their 
superior position. In the meantime, he highlights the cause-consequence relation 
between the conflicts and alignments and claims that the latter is primarily determined 
by conflicts. Usually, conflicts cause polarisation that leads the weak state to try to 
secure its existence with the support of a stronger state. Additionally, Liska believes that 
the probability of an alliance to exist without an adversary is decreased because 
alliances are always against something or someone (Liska, 1962). However, there is an 
example that seriously contradicts to this statement. For instance, NATO was 
established in order to counterbalance the threat of communism and the Warsaw Pact. 
Even though the Pact does not exist anymore, the NATO still exists and is a functioning 
organisation. So, when there is a threat to a state’s national existence, the latter will try 
to provide its security either by alliance formation or arms acquisition. By calculating 
the costs and benefits of these two options states can decide if it is worth to sacrifice 
some of its independence in an alliance with another state (Morrow, 1993).   
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Stephen Walt has an essential contribution in the Realist approach of alliance theory. He 
claims that the threat develops from a combination of geostrategic and military factors 
and “aggressive intentions”. Hence, to determine what presents a threat to the state a 
combination of certain capabilities and intentions is required (Walt, 1987). He 
highlights three essential aspects of alliance formation. First, states usually have two 
options, they either balance against strong or threatening powers, or they “bandwagon” 
with them. Second, certain states share the same or similar identities which can either 
bring states closer together or drive them apart. Last but not least, Walt considers that 
another way of creating alliances is the military and economic aid, propaganda or 
political penetration (Walt, 1985). 
When it comes to the question how states choose their allies there are two theories that 
are of central value: Balance of Power and Balance of Threat. At the centre of the 
traditional balance of power theory stands the idea that in order to avoid supremacy by 
stronger powers states join alliances. The primary theory comes from the Realist 
scholars, who claim that the states are the main actors in International Relations. 
Morgenthau believes that stability of the state can be obtained by preserving all the 
elements of the system.  Besides, he argues that if a number of states will see that the 
power is being concentrated in hands of a hegemonic authority, they will try to do 
everything to disturb that kind of power concentration (Morgenthau, 1993).  
 S. Walt argues that countries mainly join alliances to protect their interests from states 
or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a danger to their existence. There are 
two essential reasons why states will choose to balance: first, at the stake is their own 
survival. Second, alignment with a more precious ally increases the new member’s 
impact, because the weaker party has a greater need for assistance. (Walt, 1985) To ally 
with the dominant power means to place one’s trust in its continued welfare. States 
prefer to choose safer strategy and ally with those who cannot dominate their allies over 
those who can easily do that (Gulick, 1967). On the contrary, allying with a stronger 
side decreases the level of influence. Hence, alignment with the weaker side is the 
preferred choice. Defensive realism argues that balancing occurs when any state 
becomes too powerful. What great powers do is to build up their militaries which will 
make the other states feel less secure (Mearsheimer, 2006).  
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In his “Why alliances endure or collapse” analysis Walt argues that alliances are usually 
defensive or offensive. For instance, they are either intended to provide the means for an 
attack on some party or they intend to create an atmosphere of mutual guarantee in case 
of another state’s aggression. Moreover, alliances can be formed between states with 
very different regimes and political values- such as the US and the Soviet Union, or 
parties sharing similar and mutually reinforcing values – such as NATO. One of the key 
reasons why alliances endure is because they share similar political values and have a 
highly institutionalised relationship. This kind of formations will be able to adapt new 
conditions easier and be better equipped in order to handle conflicts of interests (Walt, 
2008).  
The approach that states would rather ally with the dominant side rather than against it 
is quite common. The bandwagoning hypothesis claims that states tend to ally with the 
party that poses the major threat. The logic standing behind it can be discussed from 
two perspectives. In the first place, alignment with a state that poses a threat gives the 
bandwagoner a chance to avoid an attack on itself by diverting it elsewhere. Second, an 
essential driver for alignment with the dominant side is the fact that at the end of the 
war the results will be shared (Walt, 1985).   
According to K. Waltz, balancing and bandwagoning are framed solely in terms of 
power. Balancing is alignment with the weaker party, while bandwagoning implies 
choosing the stronger party (Waltz, 1979). He, however, argues that this standpoint has 
certain flaws because it does not consider other factors when identifying potential 
threats and prospective allies. It would be more precise to say that states will rather ally 
with or against the most threatening power. Therefore, because balancing and 
bandwagoning are more accurately viewed as a response to threats, it is essential to 
consider all the factors that will affect the level of threat posed by states (Walt, 1987).  
Apart from seeing the causes of alliance formation as a result of the external threat, 
Realist scholars also consider that ideological solidarity can lead to alignment. What 
they mean by ideological solidarity is that those states that share political, cultural and 
other similarities are more inclined to form an alliance. Walt argues that states are more 
likely to follow their ideological preferences when there is no threat to their security. In 
the case of great danger, states ally with whatever option they get (Walt, 1985). After 
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all, even if Walt admits that ideology plays an important role in alliance choices, Realist 
scholars believe that it is usually a secondary motivation for alignment and most of the 
time, ideological movements that strive for tight central authority are more likely to lead 
to conflict rather than cooperation.   
Finally, the third aspect that Walt discusses the alliance formation is that economic and 
military aid from a foreign country will make the receiving state to become dependent 
on the donor. Hence, the more aid, the tighter the resulting alignment. This is reflected 
mainly in all the assisting projects that the US is implementing abroad. Meanwhile, it is 
essential to mention that instruments such as “bribery” and penetration are determinants 
of alignment, they can increase the productivity of existing alliances, but in the absence 
of common interests, they can be rarely created (Walt, 1985). 
In Realist school of thought, Steven David’s theory of omnibalancing suggests an 
alternative thinking, which gives a different meaning to the alliance formation. The 
main idea of the omnibalancing theory is that state leaders choose to ally with one 
country over the other depending on which of them would support to stay in power and 
provide their personal survival. Even if this alignment will be at the expense of 
promoting the long-term security of the state and the general welfare of its population, 
the leaders would be inclined to protect themselves and their personal interests. From 
this perspective, David argues that balance of power theory is limited as it focuses 
mainly on the external factors and fails to address the domestic ones (David, 1991).    
 
1.3 Neorealist approach to the alliance theory  
Like Realists, Neorealist scholars perceive alliances as a mean of security against 
adversaries. Therefore putting a distinction between studying them apart from other 
security policies and rivalries they respond is not possible. One of the most prominent 
works in the Neorealist school of thought belongs to Glenn Snyder, who states that 
alliances are only the formal subject of a broader and more basic phenomenon that is 
alignment. The latter implies that allying states have mutual expectations and in the case 
of disputes or wars they will have each others’ support (Snyder, 1990).   
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Neorealist researchers perceive relations among states as a structure and they base their 
theory on the system level. Kenneth Waltz claims that system is composed of actions 
and interactions of its units. Here as well, states are central actors that exist in a 
condition of anarchy that, at a minimum, seek to keep their own survival and, at 
maximum, tend to universal domination. Moreover, Waltz claims that states usually 
achieve their purposes in two ways: the first is the internal effort, which implies 
improving economic capabilities of the country, building military power, and 
developing state strategies. Second is about external efforts that include actions directed 
towards strengthening and enlarging one’s own alliance or to take actions to weaken the 
opposing one (Waltz, 1979).   
According to the Neorealist school of thinking, there are alliance and adversary games 
that are played on three policy levels: armament, action and declaration. On the 
armament level, the game between adversaries is “arms racing”. In the case of the 
alliance game, it is “burden sharing”. The action level between adversaries simply 
implies decisions whether to attack or to resist an attack. On the contrary, the alliance 
game is about to provide the victim of the attack with the aid or more broadly, intervene 
in an ongoing war or not. However, the decisions to act cannot be completely identified 
with either adversary or alliance game for they are likely to be motivated by goals. 
Meanwhile, it is important to highlight that a decision to defend another state that is 
under attack may be driven to some extent by the fact that defender does not want the 
attacker to obtain resources and leverages and keep the resources of the defendant state 
for its own defence. In both games, the declaratory interaction is the use of 
communication to manipulate others’ expectations of one’s future behaviour. This 
includes both unilateral declaration and bargaining (Snyder, 1990). 
An important aspect that Snyder refers to in his analysis is a distinction between 
multipolar and bipolar alliance systems that has been discussed in Waltz’s research. To 
start with, it is essential to build the model of a multipolar system based on the 
following assumptions: a) there are three or more major states, b) they have 
approximately equal military power, c) there are no particular conflicts of interests 
among these states, d) they don’t have complete information about each others’ 
intentions and e) alliance cannot be formed in the peacetime. From these assumptions, it 
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follows that all will feel to some extent insecure, as each party perceives that it might be 
attacked by others even though it has no specific conflicts with them. (Snyder, 1990)  
When it comes to the discussion of what states gain from alignment and how the gains 
are allocated, Paul Schroeder states the main benefit of an alliance is obviously security, 
however, there are many other non-security related values as well. For instance, the 
chances of getting attacked are significantly reduced. Second, they will have a greater 
capability for defence in case of attack. Third, alignment with a particular country may 
prevent its alignment with the adversary country of the given state. Taking into account 
all above mentioned, the principal costs of an alliance are the risk of erupting war and 
the limitation of action that should be in accordance with the partner (Schroeder, 1976).  
To analyse the costs and benefits of alignment for both allies, three general factors 
should be taken into consideration. First, what is the level of need for the alignment? 
Second, to which extent parties of the alignment meet those needs. The third issue is 
what the actual duration of the alliance contract is. It is especially important to bear in 
mind that an ally whose military capabilities are not strong will provide little security 
benefits. On the contrary, the party that has strong military capabilities will be the one 
to have domination over the other members of the created alliance (Snyder, 1990).   
Snyder and Walt share the idea that the global structure of alliance outside Europe has a 
less determining role. In Walt’s study of “Alliances in the Middle East”, it is shown that 
regional states tend to ally with superpowers in order to get aid mainly against a local 
enemy, rather than the opposite superpower. According to Walt, these small states are 
not interested in the global balance because they are so weak that do not even have the 
capability to influence that balance (Walt, 1985).  
 Another general trend that took away the traditional understanding of alliance 
formation is that states are more in favour of another kind of military and political 
collaborations, such as military aid and arms sales. The great powers give more 
preference to military aid over the formal alliances because the latter contains the risk of 
confrontation with their nuclear counterparts. Besides, this kind of collaboration does 
not limit their political freedom. Moreover, aid and sales programs have significant 
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power to influence the recipient’s alignment by increasing both his dependence and his 
expectations of more direct support (Osgood, 1968).  
One of the main criticisms addressed to the Neorealist school of thought is that it often 
fails to explain or predict events or behaviour that Neorealists have never set out to 
explain or predict in the first place. It is usually unable to accurately account for the 
specifics concerning each case of war, power balancing, or power-seeking or alliance 
formation. However, what Neorealists can claim is that their theory can be a suitable 
starting point- a logical first cut (Jacobsen, 2013).   
When security scholars identify the dynamics of alliance formation they mainly 
concentrate on two features of the state’s strategic calculus: 1) the identification of the 
threat and 2) the identification of whether and with whom to ally in response to that 
threat. Realists, in general, believe that both steps are predictably stimulated by power 
politics and systemic pressures, material factors and threats to the state’s security 
generate the definition of the threat and the decision to construct an external alignment. 
The neorealist approach to alliance formation is quite insistent that material factors 
dominate the definition of and the adopted response to that threat (Snyder, 1990).           
As we see from the presented literature, Realist and Neorealist scholars analyse the 
alliance formation from the perspective of military needs and a potential threat that is 
posed to the state security from the external environment. Scholars of both schools of 
thinking share the idea that alignments are determined by conflicts and are always 
created against some kind of threat and it is practically impossible to study them apart 
from enmities and rivalries they respond. Hence, the possibility of existence of the 
alignment without a threat is seriously decreased if not completely eliminated.  
Realist scholars claim that states sharing the same or similar identities can bring states 
closer or drive them apart. Iran and Azerbaijan share the same Muslim identity, yet this 
did not bring two countries close to each other. At the same time, it does not mean that 
it is the same Muslim identity that drove them apart. So this shows that Realist approach 
does not have the capacity to address the Armenian-Iranian alignment case.   
Even though Neorealist scholars believe that the main gain from the alliance is security, 
the distinction between the Realist and Neorealist school of thinking is that there are 
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many other non-security related values that matter. The main difference, however, 
between Realist and Neorealist schools of thinking is that to Realists’ mind both steps 
are stimulated by power politics, systemic pressure, material factors and threats to state 
security.  Whereas Neorealists insist that material factors dominate the definition of and 
the adopted response to that threat. Another approach that Neorealists have towards 
alignments formed in the Middle Eastern countries is that countries of this region ally 
with superpowers in order to get aid against a local enemy, rather than the opposite 
superpower. This approach does not apply to Armenia-Iran case as well.    
Given all these determinants of alignment, this thesis argues that neither of these two 
theories has the capacity to explain the Armenian-Iranian alignment case because the 
latter is not a threat driven. The collaboration of these two countries is not limited to 
military cooperation or there is a need to keep the domestic power with the support of 
the external ally etc. Hence, in the next section, the Constructivist approach of alliance 
theory will be discussed.    
 
1.4. Constructivist approach to the alliance theory     
The origins of constructivism in International Relations trace back to mid-1980s, when 
critical and post-modern theories suggested alternative readings of the very notions of 
reality, truth and structure, and questioned widely accepted understandings of the IR 
concepts and subfields such as the study of foreign policy (Flockhart, 2012).  
Constructivism does not suggest solutions to certain problems in IR. However, it does 
offer an alternative understanding of central IR themes such as the meaning of anarchy 
and balance of power, the state identity and interest relationship, and the prospects for 
change (Hopf, 1998).   
Given the “security dilemma” of the anarchic international system, states form foreign 
policy identity which helps to stabilise their alliances with other states and obtain their 
certain position in a security community. In International Relations the state identity 
formation helps to glue over any provisional differences of interests and create a long-
term alignment. State identity may even compel a government to hold to a particular 
foreign policy, again because of both their domestic politics and the long-term 
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international goals they intend to achieve. Moreover, what is important to highlight is 
that state identities are constructed not solely from domestic nationalistic thought, but 
they are rather influenced by state elite’s definitions of the state’s foreign interests and 
its best options for security and trade alliances. Last but not least, another essential point 
to mention is that the state identity is formed and may change in accordance with the 
external situation. Hence it may diverge from the ethnic identity and lead the country to 
make a different kind of alignment choice (Wendt, 1994).    
Michael Barnet in contrast to the realist approaches of the alliance theory argues that the 
construction of state identity suggests theoretical leverage over the issue of the threat 
construction and the choice of the alliance partner. According to Constructivist 
approach, the potential threat to the state security can be better explained from the 
perspective of identity rather than the logic of anarchy. While Realist scholars calculate 
what are the costs of additional units of security taken into consideration the state’s 
military power and highlight the importance of manoeuvring between the fears of 
entrapment and abandonment, the variable of state identity, which is equal to the 
perception of national interests, indicates which states can be more or less desirable 
partners. Barnett offers an alternative understanding of security dynamics by proposing 
a direct link between state identity and strategic behaviour. He argues that Walt’s 
theoretical framework and observations identify politics of identity rather than the logic 
of anarchy. Barnett adopts strong support for ideational rather than materialist forces in 
particular when it comes to alliance formation. In his theoretical discussion Walt 
suggests a number of examples of how intent makes an essential component of threat 
construction, however, the concept of intent is left underspecified and not enough 
theorised. Even though Walt does not specify how intent is defined, the main focus in it 
is “ideology”. (Barnett, 1996)   
There are certain functions that identities perform in a society. They tell you who you 
are and they tell you who others are (Taifel, 1981). In defining who you are identities 
imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in 
particular domains. The state identity implies its preferences and consequential actions 
(Eyre, 1996). Therefore, it is important to understand what how the national interests of 
states are defined and how they make their choice in case of alignment.   
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Constructivism refers to state identity as an empirical question that should be theorised 
within a historical context, whereas Neorealist approach assumes that all units in global 
politics have only one meaningful identity - self-interested states. In general, in 
international politics states are assumed and/or expected to have single eternal national 
interests across time and space. However, Constructivism assumes that they are variable 
and may change according to the historical, cultural, political and social context (Hopf, 
1998).  
Constructivism and Neorealism share the understanding that interests entail choices, but 
Neorealist scholars further assume that state interests are stable and they are the 
products of the social practices that mutually constitute actors and structures (Keohane, 
1988). Here is one of the weaknesses of the Neorealists, as nothing is stable, which 
immediately shows that it cannot address and explain the Armenian-Iranian alignment 
case. Iranian interests, instead of staying stable, have changed significantly because of 
regional and global developments, otherwise it would be impossible to address why 
they do not back Azerbaijan that share’s the same Shia Muslim identity.   
An essential question to ask in the constructivist approach is: why assume that a shared 
foreign policy identity can be a good basis for pacific relations and cooperation? 
Probably it will be more reasonable to think that conflict may occur among those actors 
who have a shared identity (Walt, 1987). After all, conflict is a part of the social 
relationship, as George Simmel has stated in his essay named “Conflict”. This does not 
mean that wherever we see conflict it derives from realist world or anarchy. The sources 
of conflict may vary and that is why shared identity does not guarantee peaceful 
cooperation and prevention of conflict. (Simmel,1964). 
In contrast to anarchy and material factors, when it comes to analysing the conflicts, 
identity offers better conceptual basis, at least, in two ways. First, scholars affirm that 
the relationship between identity and construction of the threat is of a special type. If we 
consider that not all states with shared identity will give the same definition to the 
threat, then they will treat those outside the group as a threat or will agree on the means 
to confront the threat, as there is an essential connection between identity and threat 
(Connolly, 1992). Wendt argues that identity might be better able to predict whether 
two states will be friends or foes than any other theory would suggest (Wendt, 1992).   
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Second, a possible source of conflict among actors sharing common identity is their 
constitutive norms. Those states that share a basic identity and organise themselves into 
a self-constituted group are likely to construct norms that instruct them on how they are 
to enact their identity. This can lead to two kinds of conflicts. First, actors with a shared 
identity might very well debate and contest their associated norms. Second, actors will 
contest to present themselves as acting in a manner that is consistent with the group’s 
norms and to portray others as acting in a manner that is inconsistent with those norms 
and thus potentially threatening to the group. If we put it another way, then we should 
say that rivalry is not over military power but rather it is over the images and the 
presentation of self, threats, hence, derive from a rival’s attempt to portray itself as 
acting in a manner that violates the group’s norms (Barnett, 1996).    
In sum, Barnett argues that identity is connected to the threat construction and 
represents a potential source of alliance formation. When contrasting it with the 
Neorealist analysis that states the choice of alliance partner is largely dependent on a 
rational calculation of costs and benefits deriving primarily from material factors, 
Barnett considers how identity shapes the choice of alliance partner and builds a 
foundation for alliance creation.  
Furthermore, identity makes some partners more attractive than others. The best 
example is the democratic peace theory according to which countries that share similar 
values are not inclined to start a war against each other (Levy, 1988).  Second, identity 
not only provides some leverage over the choice of the alliance partner, but it also 
suggests that the maintenance of that alliance can be dependent on the parties’ mutual 
identification. Therefore, common identity might not make the basis of alliance 
stronger, but on the contrary, undermine the alliance’s foundation. Because an essential 
basis for the strategic association is not simply shared interests in relationship to an 
identified threat but rather a shared identity that promotes an affinity and mutual 
identification, the language of community arguably better captures this type of strategic 
association. Besides, there are two essential aspects of the identity that should be taken 
into consideration when it comes to alliance formation. First, identity provides a better 
conceptual link to the construction of the threat than do anarchy and other materialistic 
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derivations. Second, identity potentially informs as to who is deemed an attractive ally 
(Adler, 1994).  
In Constructivism, norms have an essential place. In order to see the distinction between 
norms and the construction of national interests and why this thesis gives priority to the 
second one, some characteristics of norms should be discussed. Katzenstein defines 
them as “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” 
(Katzenstein, 1996). Because norms by definition imply a quality of “oughtness” and 
shared moral assessment, they prompt justification for action and leave an extensive 
trail of communication among actors that we can study. Norm influence can be 
perceived as three stage processes: 1) norm emergence, 2) broad norm acceptance – 
“norm cascade”, 3) internalisation (Finnemore, 1996).  
The characteristic mechanism of the first stage is persuasion by norm entrepreneurs. 
The latter usually try to persuade a critical mass of states to embrace new norms. The 
second stage is attributed by a dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to 
socialise other states to become norm followers. The norm internalisation occurs when 
norms acquire taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public 
debate. It is important to understand that norms do not occur out of thin air. They are 
actively built by agents having a strong understanding about appropriate or desirable 
behaviour in their community (Finnemore, 1996).   
As we see, the Constructivist approach to the alliance formation is significantly 
different from the Realist and Neorealist schools of thinking. The state identity and 
perception of national interests of the state have central value in Constructivism. In the 
case of Armenia and Iran, it must be argued that state interests are the decisive factor for 
the alignment.  
Armenia and Iran both share common interests which make them attractive allies for 
each other in order to develop peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation. What 
Constructivist scholars argue is that the state interests is variable and may change 
depending on historical, cultural, political and social contexts. We clearly see this 
pattern in the case of Iran which has changed the definition of its national interests and 
entered into an alignment with Armenia, even though it was expected that the religion 
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will play a more decisive role in its foreign policy. Therefore, the hypothesis that this 
thesis suggests is that Constructivist approach has a better capacity to explain the 
Armenian-Iranian alignment case than other theories because it is not focusing merely 
on the external security issues but rather on the construction of the national interests of 
Armenia and Iran. As Finnemore argues, constructivism is a social theory that makes 
claims about the nature of the social changes. It does not have a capacity to produce 
specific connections about political outcomes that can be tested in the social science. 
Hence, from this perspective Constructivism is similar to rational choice which is 
argued in the case of Iran.  
The empirical data that includes analysis of the National Security Strategy documents, 
various comparative studies on the Iranian-Armenian relation and the conducted 
interviews with the Armenian experts and diplomats show that the Constructivism 
theory among all the other discussed theories has better grounds for explaining the 
alignment pattern of Armenia and Iran. In order to make it more distinct, the next 
chapter will discuss the foreign policy approaches of Armenia and Iran, how the 
national interests of the two countries are constructed and what leads Iran to make an 
alignment choice that contradicts the general assumption of the alliance theory.            
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Part 2 
Armenian and Iranian foreign policy approaches and 
construction of national interests 
2.1. Armenia’s foreign policy towards Iran and the construction of its 
national interests     
This section of the thesis is going to analyse how Armenia see the alignment with Iran 
and what are the reasons of cooperation based on the National Security Strategy 
Document of the Republic of Armenia (RA), analysis in academic sources, interviews 
with experts and diplomats and local media. It is important to mention that all these 
sources discuss the importance of alignment with Iran from the geostrategic, economic, 
cultural and psychological perspective. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that when one 
searches information on Armenian-Iranian relations on the media majority of the 
information found has an emphasis on the Armenia’s economic benefits from the 
cooperation with Iran. Yet, in order to understand why Armenia allies with Iran a 
multidimensional analysis must be made.  
Throughout the history, the geopolitical position of Armenia has left the country with a 
difficult choice on how to act on the chessboard of interests of different regional and 
non-regional global actors. The fact of being at the crossroad of diverse interests has 
made Armenia try to keep balance and develop equally friendly relations with all the 
interested parties in the region. As every state, Armenia’s foreign policy is aimed at 
reinforcing the country’s external security, preserving favourable conditions for its 
development, develop and strengthen cooperation with the partner states, tackle the 
issues with the regional problems and create an atmosphere of cooperation (National 
Security Strategy Document, 2007).  
Armenia does not have officially accepted foreign policy doctrines that address issues of 
cooperation with other states. However, it has a National Security Strategy Document 
adopted in 2007 that to some extent reflects the foreign policy approaches. The main 
idea reflected in the Document is comprised in the concept of complementarism. The 
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term is related to the name of Vardan Oskanyan, who was the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs from 1998-2008. The policy of complementarism is meant to preserve the 
balance between the interests of the regional and international powers instead of siding 
with one or another (Minasyan, 2009).   
Armenian foreign policy has an essential task to strengthen the security of the country 
and develop its relations with neighbouring countries. As the focus of the thesis is 
Armenian-Iranian alignment, the foreign policy approaches towards the other countries 
or international organisations will not be discussed.  Sh. Kocharyan, current Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Armenia (RA), mentions that relations with 
neighbouring countries are of high priority for Armenia as it is bound by these states 
throughout the history (Kocharyan, 2012). This statement obviously refers to Iran, as 
whenever there is a discussion about the bilateral relations between the two countries 
historical ties are brought forward immediately.  
Since the 1990s, the Armenian leadership has made it clear that it is ready to get 
engaged in regional and global integration process regardless the fact that the Nagorno-
Karabakh (NK) conflict has not been resolved. Given the status quo in the conflict over 
the NK, it is not realistic to expect that the latter will be solved in a short-term period, 
and not even in the medium-term. Consequently, Armenia should take this into account 
and try to develop its relations with other regional countries (Iskandrayan, 2010). In this 
context, Iran stands in a very special position, 
According to the National Security Strategy Document, developing friendly relations 
with Iran has objective reasons for Armenia such as neighbourhood, historical-cultural 
ties and mutual economic interests. One of the transit routes connecting Armenia with 
the external world passes through Iran. Especially given the isolation from Armenia’s 
two neighbours: Azerbaijan and Turkey, Iran has an important strategic role connecting 
Armenia with Asia and the Middle East. Two countries cooperate in the energy field 
and implement a number of projects aimed to provide Armenia with alternative means 
of energy security. Moreover, relations with Iran are of central value for Armenia, 
because Iran being a significant player in the region and in the Islamic world, leads a 
balanced policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (National Security Strategy 
Document, 2007).    
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When discussing Armenian-Iranian relations one should be careful with misleading and 
extreme statements such as Iran is an Islamic country and may present a threat to 
Armenia from the religious perspective. On the one hand, it should be made clear that 
Iranian foreign policy’s priority is not presenting a threat to the national or religious 
identity of Armenia. On the other hand, the misleading impression that the relations of 
two countries are perfect must be avoided, because Iran perceives South Caucasus as its 
historical land and this idea has been inserted in minds of Iranians over years. The proof 
of this is that even during the everyday conversations Iranians mention about this. This 
implies that Iran has not given up the idea to see South Caucasus as a part of its 
territorial control
1
.   
One of the leading experts on Iran in Armenia, Vardan Voskanyan, in his interview 
mentions that it should be taken into account the interrelation of Armenia and Iran 
dating back to centuries. The Armenian and Iranian border in our region, and by our 
region both the Middle East in a broader sense and South Caucasus is included, is one 
of the oldest borders that have ever existed in the world. This is an important factor, 
given that in the region there are newly created countries that do not have precise 
understanding, in the first place, regarding their own identity. In this sense, the 
historical Armenian-Iranian good relations give us a proper basis to build our relations 
nowadays. Even though in modern political science this factor is ignored most of the 
time, Mr Voskanyan believes that this is still a significant factor and should be taken 
into consideration
2
.  
Another important feature is the cultural and political co-relation between Iranians and 
Armenians that dates back to centuries. For instance, one of the proves of Armenians 
being a local nation is Achaemenid leader Darius 1st’s Behistun Inscription, where 
Armenia’s name is mentioned in three languages. There are two bright examples in 
terms of productivity between Armenian-Iranian military-political alignment coming 
from ancient times. First is the text on the friendship of Kourosh and Tigran Ervandyan 
mentioned by Armenian historian Movses Khorenatsi, and the second is when the 
military commander Krasos’s head was shown to the Parthian military commander 
                                                          
1
 Interview with an Armenian Diplomat, MFA, April 11, 2017 
2
 Interview with the Head of the Iranian Studies Department at the Yerevan State University, April 5, 
2017 
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Suren in Artashat after defeated by Armenian-Parthian soldiers in 53 BC. This lets the 
two countries build their relations, not from the very beginning, but base them on 
historical, cultural, political, linguistic strong grounds
3
.  
Given that the main concern of Armenia is its security, then the foreign policy is 
directed towards providing proper conditions for the state’s development. Taking into 
account the specifics of the geographical position of Armenia, closed borders with 
Turkey and Azerbaijan, the connection with the external world is highly dependent on 
Iran and Georgia (Mesamed, 2013). In this context, the role of Iran is highly important, 
especially in the light of the war broke out between Georgia and Russia in 2008. It 
showed that Armenia should diversify its foreign policy and establish closer relations 
with Iran because the Russia-Georgia war was perceived as an essential security threat 
to Armenia (Markarov, 2016).  
Another leading Armenian experts Richard Giragosian, who is the Head of the Regional 
Studies Centre (RSC), supports the idea that Iran has been always important for 
Armenia as an alternative or secondary way to overcome isolation. Given that two of 
four Armenia’s borders are closed, Georgia has an essential role for much of the 
transportation and energy and Iran is a very important alternative. This is why Armenia 
imports 20-25% of its trade through Iran. Besides, when international sanctions are 
lifted, Armenia can position itself as a unique bridge linking Iran with the West
4
. 
Iran’s geographic position from the perspective of transit route has vital importance for 
Armenian national interests not only in terms of security but also the economy. 
According to the Transportation Minister G. Beglaryan, Armenian and Iranian 
governments have agreed to ship two containers from the Indian port Mumbai to the 
Black Sea and on to Europe via the Persian Gulf and Iran in order to see if it is 
economically more beneficial route compared to Turkey and Azerbaijan. According to 
rough calculations, the cost of transit route should be lower and Armenia may seriously 
benefit from this (News.am, 2016).  
On the Presidential level, the leaders of the two States H. Rouhani and S. Sargsyan have 
discussed that all efforts will be put in order to create Persian Gulf-Black Sea corridor.  
                                                          
3
 Interview with an Armenian Diplomat, April 11, 2017.  
4
 Interview with the Head of the Regional Studies Centre, April 12, 2017.  
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The Armenian government has borrowed $150 million from the Kazakhstan-based 
Eurasian Development Bank last year to rebuild a 20-kilometer road currently going 
through a mountain pass close to Agarak. It is planned to construct a 4-kilometer tunnel 
there which will significantly shorten travel from the Iranian border to Yeraskh, a 
railway station about 50 kilometres south-east of Yerevan (Danielyan, 2017). The 
Armenia-Iran railway will add to Iran’s role as a transit route for Armenia. The latter 
can also contribute to the Chinese “New Silk Road” project (News.am, 2015).  
Goods coming from India and Iran will be transported to Yeraskh by trucks and then 
shipped to Georgian Black Sea port of Poti by rail. (Harutyunyan, 2016) At the same 
time, Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Seyed Kazem Sajjadi stated that Iran is interested 
in this project and is planning to send experts to evaluate the possibility of railway 
construction (Asbarez.com, 2016). From this perspective, Armenia sees Iran as an actor 
the cooperation with which will significantly boost its economy which is a serious 
investment in its security and is considered to be one of the main tasks embedded in the 
National Security Strategy Document.  
Armenia sees Iran as an important partner in trade relations as much as in geopolitical 
and security issues
5
. In general, during the last five years, Armenia and Iran enjoyed 
fairly stable and mostly sustainable trade relations. Currently, Iran serves as the 7th 
trading partner for Armenia for exports and stands 5th for imports (National Statistics 
Service of Armenia, 2016). 
The energy sector is another sphere of cooperation with Iran that makes a serious 
contribution in constructing the Armenian national interests. According to the barter 
agreement between the two states, Armenia has been exporting electricity to Iran in 
exchange for gas since 2009
6
.  
                                                          
5
 From 2005-2011, trade turnover between Armenia and Iran doubled, increasing from 
177.7$ million to 323$ million. However, imposing sanctions on Iran in 2012 had a 
negative impact on bilateral economic relations and resulted in the reduction of both 
imports and exports (Business for business, 2016). 
6
 By now, Armenia has imported 2.2 billion cubic meters of gas and provided 6.2 billion 
kilowatt hours of electricity. According to the Armenia’s Deputy Minister of Energy 
and Natural Resources Hayk Harutyunyan, the agreement is beneficial for both parties, 
and Armenia plans to import more Iranian gas, and hence export more electricity. 
Additionally, he said that Yerevan and Tehran signed a $120 million agreement on the 
construction of a third electrical transmission line between the two countries during the 
coming 18 months (Baghdasaryan, 2016).   
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Given that Armenia does not have oil and gas resources, it is highly dependent on the 
import of gas from foreign countries, meaning Russia and Iran. In this sense, Iran has a 
central security and economic role in terms of gas supply, because it is an alternative to 
Russia and to some extent may decrease Armenia’s dependence on it. Yet, it has faced a 
number of difficulties. The gas pipeline between Armenia-Iran was ready to function 
from March 2007. Initially, the diameter of the gas pipeline was supposed to be 56 
inches wide, but it was reduced only to 28 inches, because of the Russian intervention 
(Baghdasaryan, 2016). Armenia accepted this reality because it is highly dependent on 
Russia in a number of fields, whereas Iran took into account its policy adopted towards 
the Caucasus and Russian interests in the region (Khachatryan, 2006).  
It will be economically cheaper for Armenia to import Iranian rather than Russian gas 
because of the geographical location since the transit costs will not be as high as in the 
case of Russia
7
. Nevertheless, the diversification of Armenian gas imports will be 
difficult not only because of the Russian pressure but also due to the limited capacity of 
Armenian-Iranian gas pipeline launched in 2007. Meanwhile, the head of the Islamic 
Republic’s national gas company Alireza Kameli said that Georgia and Iran have 
negotiated imports of Iranian natural gas through neighbouring Armenia and Georgia 
can receive it at its border (Azatutyun Radiokayan, 2016). This is another way how 
Armenia can benefit from the bilateral relations with Iran and why the development of 
collaboration with Iran is so essential.    
Another project that is of central value for Armenia is the construction of hydro-electric 
station located in Meghri. The construction of that facility officially started in December 
2012 and is planned to be completed in 2018. According to the agreement, the 
construction costs ($323 million) will be paid by the Iranian side and in return, the 
produced energy during the first 15 years will be provided to Iran for free, after which 
Armenia will have the complete ownership of the power plant (Armenpress news 
agency, 2015).    
                                                          
7
 According to Armenian Customs Service Data, for instance, in 2014 Armenia paid 
over $183 per 1000 cubic meters for Iranian gas and roughly $266 for Russian gas 
imports. In 2015, the price was $188 and $122 respectively.  Even when the Gazprom 
reduced the gas tariff, it did not make any difference for Armenian household and 
corporate consumers. So, the Gazprom uses its monopoly in this sphere and sets its own 
pricing policy (News.am, 2015).   
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The opinion that the economic cooperation is the base for political relations with Iran is 
quite widespread. However, even if economy plays a significant role in Armenia’s 
perception of Iran, it should not be overestimated. Mr Voskanyan states that: Armenian-
Iranian alignment is not merely economy based, geopolitics matters a great deal. We 
have seen a number of examples that the economy does not have any influence on 
political relations when at the stake are geopolitical interests. A good example is the 
case with the Russian aeroplane that was shot by Turkey given the Moscow’s reaction 
that followed the incident
8
.  
Tourism is another sphere of cooperation the development of which is in Armenia’s 
national interests. Taken into account that Armenia does not have natural resources, 
developed industry, way out to the sea etc, it should try to develop other directions that 
to some extent can promote the country’s economic development. Hence, tourism is one 
of those fields. Armenia is one of the main tourism destinations for Iranians because of 
the close geographical location, attractions and entertainment. Iranian tourists hold the 
third position among all the tourists visiting Armenia after Russia and the United States 
(Baghdasaryan, 2016). One important achievement in this field was the adoption of 
visa-free travel regulation which let citizens of both countries travel freely (Radiofarda, 
2015). Even though visa fees were not an obstacle for tourists to travel, this kind of 
regulation showed how high the level of mutual trust and partnership between the two 
states is. 
From the psychological perspective, one aspect that contributes to the construction of 
Armenia’s perception of Iran is the animosity with Turkey. This pushed Armenians 
towards Iran, especially after the Armenian Genocide of 1915, as many found their 
refuge in Iran. When Armenians were running from the Ottoman forces, Iranians 
accepted them and protected them. Iranians have a saying that the Holy Book (referring 
to Koran) does not raise a hand on people and as Iran considers itself as the true 
follower of Islam they did not permit bloodshed on their territory (Iskandaryan, 2017). 
Besides, the fact there is a significant Armenian Diaspora living in Iran and they have 
the possibility to preserve their culture and religion without facing any pressure from 
the Islamic regime constructs a friendly image of Iran in Armenia (Zarifian, 2008).   
                                                          
8
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 In sum, from the Armenian side alignment with Iran, in the first place, seems to be a 
natural choice, as two of its four borders are closed and there is a need to have a 
connection with the outside world. Armenia has a way out to the external world via 
Georgia as well, however, given the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, there was 
a need to find an alternative to Georgia. Armenia and Iran have strong cooperation links 
in the fields of economy, energy, trade relations and a number of projects are 
implemented in this field, however, the alignment with Iran is not merely economy 
driven. In the construction of Armenian interests towards Iran, the multi-dimensional 
analysis shows that geopolitics, security, economy, some psychological aspects play 
significant role, however, among all the mentioned dimensions the security and 
geopolitics play the most decisive role.  
 
2.2 Iranian foreign policy towards Armenia and the construction of its 
national interests   
 When we talk about the foreign policy doctrines of Iran it is important to take into 
consideration the rich history, culture as well as diplomatic traditions of this country. It 
should be stated that Iran, like Armenia, does not have foreign policy doctrines as such, 
but its main foreign policy goals are embedded in the National Security Strategy 
Document adopted in 2012. In this document, there is not much stated about the 
approach towards Armenia, it is rather included in the policy adopted towards the 
Caucasus region and presents general statements that Iran develops friendly and 
cooperative relations with neighbouring Muslim and non-Muslim countries are 
mentioned. So, this section as well is based on the National Security Strategy 
Document, analysis of experts, academic/media articles, and interviews on how Iranian 
national interests towards the region and particularly Armenia are formulated. 
If we compare the early-Islamic period, middle ages and current Iranian foreign policy 
we can see that the main aims and directions, in general, have not changed. However, 
depending on the challenges of the given time-period Iranian government has made 
certain adjustments to its national interests in order to meet the current needs. After the 
Revolution, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) was based on a 
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number of objectives that are embedded in the country’s Constitution and the National 
Security Strategy Document. According to these documents, outside the Iranian borders, 
Iran aims to preserve and promote its regional and global position, spread its ideas, 
including Islamic democracy, expand its bilateral and multilateral relations, particularly 
with neighbouring countries, foster peace and security at both the regional and the 
international levels through positive engagement, and promote international 
understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction (Sanahan, 2015). The last two 
points specifically lead to the Iranian approach towards the NK conflict which will be 
discussed later on.  
Having the preservation of security of the borders as a primary concern, it is clear that 
Iranian foreign policy has a realistic and rational approach. Even though the West and 
some neighbouring countries of Iran had concerns about the Islamic Republic’s mandate 
to export the revolution, Iran’s regional foreign policy in the Caucasus is completely 
pragmatic. When studying different approaches the Islamic regime used towards 
Caucasian Republics we see that the geopolitical and economic realities that Iran is 
facing today are completely different (Sadri, 2012).  This shows that religious ideology 
does not play a role in defining its relations with Armenia.  
The multi-dimensional analysis of Iranian-Armenian relations shows that there are a 
number of reasons why alignment with Armenia is in Iranian national interests. First, 
when the Caucasus region was a part of the Soviet Union, the only way connecting Iran 
with Europe was Turkey. Turkey used this fact in order to put pressure on Iran and 
dictate its own rules in terms of bilateral relations (Bethayi Asal, 2006). In accordance 
with this, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the main tasks of Iranian foreign 
policy became the establishment of good relations with the newly independent 
neighbouring countries (MFA of IRI, 2017). This would let Iran get away from the 
Turkish pressure and obtain alternative way connecting with Europe. Even though there 
are religious differences between Armenia and Iran, geopolitical position of Armenia 
makes Iran ignore religion-based approaches and focus on the rational calculations. So 
the decision to ally with Armenia was in line with Iran’s national interests.  
Iran perceives Armenia as a country that experiences the same kind of isolation as Iran. 
If Armenia is isolated because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and closed borders 
37 
 
with Azerbaijan and Turkey, Iran is isolated because of the international western 
sanctions. Despite their religious division, both Tehran and Yerevan need regional and 
global allies. Therefore, mutual benefits and cooperation connected with the alignment 
have driven away any possible ideological and religious differences (Sadri, 2012).  This 
makes it visible that there is a need to take into account three aspects in terms of 
bilateral relations with Armenia: strategic, geographic and geopolitical specifics 
(Giragosian, 2005). 
According to Barzegar, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, regionalism has become 
one of the main features of the Iranian Foreign Policy (Barzegar, 2010). The global 
diplomatic approaches of the revolutionary regime appear to frame even the most 
pragmatic regional position over the South Caucasus (Bataille, 2010). Strategically 
Armenia has a position that makes it an attractive ally for Iran. It would have been 
definitely more beneficial for Iran if the border between Turkey and Armenia was open. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Turkey conditions normalisation of Turkish-Armenian 
relations with the NK conflict decreases the prospect of more beneficial transit 
conditions for Iran. Yet, Armenia is a better alternative given the previously put 
pressure from Turkey. In this contexts, it is interesting to see that Iranian media, even 
when talking about the external pressure on Iran, highlights the importance of alignment 
as a two-way collaboration between Armenia and Iran, especially taken into account the 
close historical, cultural, political and security ties (Iranian Diplomacy, 2009).      
No matter how important the role of history in bilateral relations between the two 
countries is, the current security and geopolitical situation of the region is a more 
decisive actor. The Armenian and Iranian relations have been stable and sustainable and 
the sphere of cooperation has been mainly political and economic. The fact that 
Armenia’s geographical location provides Iran with access to European countries makes 
Armenia a more attractive partner (Koolaee, 2010). Some of the scholars claim that Iran 
has put more emphasis on its economic interests versus adopting fully religious 
ideology in their foreign relations and understood that many countries were reluctant to 
trade with Iran, if it decided to spread Islam forcefully (Gresh, 2006). Further analysis 
will show that if in Armenia’s case economy may play a very important role, in Iran’s 
case economy is still not as decisive as the geopolitics. Consequently, from the Iranian 
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perspective, it is better to focus on the strategic role of Armenia for securing Iran and its 
geopolitical role.  
As it has been already mentioned before, in order to understand the reasons why Iran 
chose alignment with Armenia a multi-dimensional analysis should be done. From the 
political perspective, the Iranian-Azerbaijani relations significantly explain the drivers 
resulting in Iran’s alignment choice. To start with, it is important to mention that Iran 
and Azerbaijan share a number of similarities. First, both countries have historical-
cultural, religious serious commonalities. Second, Azerbaijan is the second country after 
Iran with Shia Muslim majority population. Third, there are around 20 million Azeris 
living in Iran. Finally, in its foreign policy, Iran has adopted an approach to give priority 
to Muslim countries when establishing relations with other countries (Begijanyan, 
2015).  
However, along with these similarities, they have a number of differences that seem to 
be much more essential in defining the alignment pattern. First, they have ideological 
differences- Azerbaijan is a secular state, Iran is an Islamic republic. They do not share 
the same approaches about jurisdictional issues of the Caspian Sea. The pollution of the 
Sea poses a long-term threat to Iran’s economic interests. (Dorraj, 2013) Third and most 
importantly, there is the issue of “Iranian Azerbaijan” – a northern region of Iran 
bordering with Azerbaijan. Nationalistic circles of the Republic of Azerbaijan have 
claims to join this region with the Republic of Azerbaijan because there are around 15-
20 million Turkish-speaking Iranians – Azeris, living there. This was extremely 
expressive during the presidency of the first president of RA Abulfaz Elichibey. Even 
though the situation changed and the Azerbaijani rhetoric towards “Iranian Azerbaijan” 
became more subtle, Iranian government still remains suspicious. While some scholars 
argue that this is one of the reasons explaining Armenian-Iranian alignment, it is mostly 
denied by the Iranian officials. Additionally, pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanism also 
includes “the attachment of Iranian Azerbaijan to the Republic of Azerbaijan” as it will 
be necessary to establish a land corridor between Azerbaijan and their Turkish-speaking 
ethnic kin in Central Asia. Hence, this leads to Armenia and Iran’s displacement 
(Zarifian, 2008). In terms of Pan-Turanism and Pan-Turkism, it must be also noted that 
this rivalry has its deep roots in Iranian history that is embedded in the Iranian epic 
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poem “Shahnameh” (transl. King’s letter) where the main topic is the enmity between 
Iran and Turan. This implies that the differences between Azerbaijan and Iran, the threat 
to the Iranian territorial integrity and the possible rise of Turkic actors in the region play 
a much more essential role in constructing national interests than the religion and the 
fact of Azerbaijan being a Shia country when allying with Armenia.   
Iran-Turkey relations are another major aspect revealing Iranian interests in alignment 
with Armenia. Traditionally these two countries never had excellent relations. However, 
even if they are presented as radically different in political-economic-social models, 
there are still some aspects that bring those two together, such an example is the 
Kurdish issue. On the other hand, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey and 
Iran have become competing actors in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The idea of 
influence is very important for Iranians, as during the rule of the Persian Empire Iran 
had an influence on a larger territory than it has today, and Iranian leaders have always 
been open that it is essential for Iran to maintain a broad influence in the region. So, 
given that most of the ex-Soviet Caucasian republics have chosen to have closer 
relations with Turkey rather than Iran, Armenia is the only country that has taken a pro-
Iranian position (Zarifian, 2008).  
A noteworthy aspect of understanding the Iranian foreign policy towards Armenia can 
be reflected in once incident as well. For instance, in 2007, Mahmud Ahmadinejad had 
an official visit which was supposed to last for 22 hours. Going back to Tehran he 
announced that even though the visit was planned for 22 hours, he spend half an hour 
more. Yet, the head of the Armenian MFA declared that he finished the program 30 
minutes earlier and missed two important events, one of which was attending the 
Armenian Genocide Memorial. In fact, this way Iran was trying to avoid any negative 
reaction from Baku and Ankara, as in 2004 President Mohammad Khatami visited the 
Genocide Memorial, which arose a wave of condemnation and dissatisfaction in Baku 
and Ankara. Ahmadinejad was highly criticised by media for having this official visit to 
Armenia, let alone he would visit the Genocide Memorial (Begijanyan, 2011). This 
shows that Iranian leaders are extremely careful in their actions and do not want to 
cause anger and dissatisfaction inside the country which may lead to the weakening of 
their positions. In other words, even though Iran values good relations with Armenia, 
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Iranian political leaders lead a balanced foreign policy in order not to trigger anger of 
their Muslim neighbours and cause separatist movements inside the country.   
One of the leading experts of the National Defence Research University in Armenia, 
Benyamin Poghosyan, sees the construction of Iranian interests in the context of the 
cooperation with Armenia the following way: first, Iran sees Armenia as a partner taken 
into consideration the Azerbaijan-Turkey relations and the growth of the Turkish 
impact. In other words, Iran sees Armenia as a partner which can decrease or neutralise 
the Turkic factor in the South Caucasus
9
. Additionally, Iran continues to stay anti-
Turkish states, as Iran-Turan relations have political-ideological contradictions for 
centuries, just like the Armenian-Turkish relations (Torgomyan, 2008).   
Armenia is a strategic partner for Iran because of security reasons. First, in Yerevan 
Tehran has found the right partner to decrease Ankara’s influence in the South 
Caucasus. Both states are aware that Russia plays a significant role in the region in 
limiting Western influence (via NATO and EU) and decreasing the Turkish role. For 
Tehran, however, Russian influence in the region provides an opportunity to offer a 
“lesser-evil- partner” option for interests in Caucasus states (Sadri, 2012). Second, 
another security concern directed against Iran is coming from Azerbaijan. Iranians had 
major concerns that Azerbaijani territory can be used for US-Israeli machinations 
against Iran. Third, Azerbaijan’s close cooperation with the West and its growing 
interests in joining NATO presents a serious threat to Iranian national security in the 
region as Iran does not want to see any kind of foreign military forces close to its 
borders (Dorraj, 2013). Therefore, all these aspects contributed to the Iranian alignment 
choice that will counterbalance the Azerbaijan-US-Israel collaboration and create the 
opposite Armenia-Russia-Iran vector.     
Mr Poghosyan further argues that Armenia is an alternative way towards Europe and 
Russia. As for Europe, the North-South transportation corridor that is under 
construction is going to play a vital role in connecting the region with Europe. Meaning 
that the route will get to Georgian ports and then through the sea to Ukraine. As Iran 
supports diversity, they want to have different alternatives and Armenia can play an 
essential role here
10
.  
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Iranian leaders realise how important the ties with Armenia are in securing the 
economic survival of Iran given the current climate of economic sanctions and isolation 
that both states face. Iran has a stronger relationship with Armenia than with any other 
Caucasus country in the world, while Armenia’s major objective is economic security 
Iran seeks to expand its oil and natural gas exports into Eastern Europe (Sadri, 2012). 
As the spheres of economic cooperation have already been presented in the previous 
section, there is no need to discuss it in this chapter as well.    
Another aspect making Armenia attractive ally for Iran is Armenia’s membership to the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Armenian ambassador to Iran Artashes Tumanyan, in 
an interview given to the Iranian “Donyaye Eghtesad” Iranian newspaper, mentions that 
the economic cooperation with Armenia is of vital importance for Iran, as Armenia is a 
member of the EEU which gives a new meaning to the Armenian-Iranian cooperation 
because of two major factors. First, this means that by entering Armenia Iranian goods 
will have access to the EEU. Second, when Iranian investors establish an organisation in 
Armenia, then the produced products can circulate in EEU countries without taxes. This 
implies that they immediately have access to a market of 200 million populations living 
in the EEU (Tumanyan, 2015).      
The psychological aspect of Iranian perception of Armenia also plays some role in the 
construction of the national interests. It can be seen in the saying “The Armenian does 
not lie” and they are loyal people. Besides, at the time when the Iranian leaders and 
elites were considering their country being exploited by colonial powers such as 
England and Russia, they accepted Armenians as a stable and reliable group. Already in 
the second part of the 20
th
 century, it is a common perception among Iranians that 
Armenians gave their lives to the nation at the time of Iran-Iraq war as many of them 
had participated in the war (Zarifian, 2008).   
This leads to the next point: the role of Armenian minority living in Iran. Tehran has a 
special foreign policy adopted towards the Armenian minority living in Iran which aims 
to demonstrate democratic, pro-human rights nature of the Islamic Republic. This has 
an important place on Iranian foreign policy agenda, as it is criticised by the US and the 
EU for non-compliance with international standards on human rights. Last but not least, 
the good relations with Christian Armenia are used by the Iranian authorities to 
demonstrate the dialogue of civilisations promoted by reformist President Mohammad 
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Khatami. The Iranian ambition to appear as an advocate of religious dialogue is aimed 
to appear as ‘’a bridge between East and West” not only in their historical roles as a 
Diaspora but also as an important element of their contemporary identity (Mirzoyan, 
2010). 
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Part 3 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the construction of 
Armenian-Iranian alignment  
 
3.1 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and its role in the Armenian-
Iranian alignment in Armenian, Iranian and Russian media 
articles    
Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) is a disputed region between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
over which a war broke out in 1988. Nowadays, most Armenians use the term Artsakh 
along with the term Karabakh in Armenian, Russian and English. Even though in 
English the official name of the territory is ‘’Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’’, ‘’Artsakh’’ 
is an attractive alternative that has distinctive political and ideological significance.  
In the 19
th
 century it was a part of Armenian cultural and literary movement and from 
the geopolitical perspective, it is significant from three aspects. First, Artsakh is the 
authentic Armenian name for the territory, one that joins the modern territory to a 
genealogy of ancient Armenian polities. Second, the use of the term is meant for 
purification of the language, as the name ‘’Karabakh’’ is held as somewhat imperfect 
because it implicitly signifies Persian and Turkic impact upon the territory. Hence, by 
highlighting the Armenian version of the term the foreign influence is somehow 
minimised. Third, the term is related to the idea of revivalist agenda and project, an 
imagined ‘’return to an original identity’’ after the history of foreign capture and 
repression.  The term Karabakh came into use following the Mongol and Turkic 
invasions of the region in subsequent centuries. However, Armenians have tended to 
use the terms Artsakh and Karabakh interchangeably since (Toal, 2013). 
The reason of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s existence lies back in 1921 when the 
Caucasus bureau, governed by Joseph Stalin, changed a decision initially considering 
NK as part of Armenia and awarded it to the Soviet Azerbaijan by giving it wide 
regional autonomy. Originally, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) 
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shared a border with the Soviet Armenia but by 1930s that link was eliminated, and the 
NKAO became an enclave with a majority Armenian population surrounded by 
Azerbaijani territory (Toal, 2013).   
In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh voted to secede from then-Soviet Azerbaijan and join 
Armenia, which put the beginning of a bloody war between the two countries 
throughout the years to come after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result of war 
around 30.000 people died and hundreds of thousands displaced before 1994 ceasefire 
agreement. Armenian forces took control over the Nagorno-Karabakh and several 
surrounding regions which are considered to be buffer zone and provide security of the 
NK population from direct threats. Even though the ceasefire agreement was agreed, 
low-scale fighting continued along the borders (The Economist, 2016).    
In 1992, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Since 1994: OSCE) 
joined the settlement process of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-
Karabakh. In 1994 ceasefire agreement was mediated by Russia, Kyrgyzstan and the 
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Inter-parliamentary Council and 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh signed the Bishkek Document on May 5, 
1994. According to that document, signatory parties agreed to a ceasefire effective from 
that date on. The institute of co-chairmanship of Russia, France and USA of the OSCE 
Minsk Group was created later on, in 1997, which since then has been the only agreed 
format with the mandate from the OSCE to conduct mediating activities for the peaceful 
settlement of the Karabakh conflict (MFA of NKR, 2017).  
In the regional context, all immediate neighbouring countries of the Karabakh conflict 
have their own national interests, in the first place, in terms of security. Since the 
beginning of the conflict, Iran has officially announced that it does not support any of 
the parties and stands for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.   
To understand the Iranian position a thorough analysis was required. At the time of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Iran has just got out of the eight-year devastating 
war with Iraq and had completed the transition process of the post-Khomeini era. At this 
period, Iran was focused on domestic issues, especially its post-war reconstruction and 
renewal of political ties. The new president of the Islamic Republic, Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani was trying to moderate Iranian foreign policy and re-establish relations with 
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the West, including the United States but also, a major Iranian concern for this time-
period was to keep stable relations with Russia and avoid any behaviour that could 
contradict their interests (Hunter, 2017).  
By the end of 1992, Armenia had captured the majority of the Karabakh’s territory and 
forced around 700.000 Azerbaijanis to flee their homes in the area (Leeuw, 2000). This 
triggered a massive amount of influx of Azerbaijanis to cross the Iranian border. Iran 
sent troops to the borders by the beginning of 1993 and provided Azerbaijan with 
humanitarian aid for refugees. Tehran was afraid that this will trigger nationalist 
sentiment, therefore prevented refugees from further entering the country. Besides, 
another threat from the created situation was that it could have been used by outside 
powers to destabilise the country from the inside (Gresh, 2006). 
In order to provide its own security and strengthen its positions in the region, Iran 
decided to bypass its political competitors: Russia and Turkey and tried to negotiate a 
dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In order to implement this plan, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Iran Ali Akbar Velayati arrived in Baku and suggested to establish a 
ceasefire, at least, for a short period of time. As a result, both Armenian and Azerbaijani 
sides agreed to stop fire for a couple of days. However, by the time the agreement 
would enter into force, Armenian forces have already planned to seize the city of 
Khojalu which had an important strategic position for both parties, as it was considered 
to be the gate to Stepanakert and from here Azeri forces were in a position to open fire 
on Armenian populated territories. Besides, the only airport of Nagorno-Karabakh was 
located in Khojalu, so all these factors contributed to the implementation of operation 
planned by the Armenian forces. The seizure of the city showed that Iranian mediation 
was not successful, which, of course, undermined Iranian reputation in front of the 
Azerbaijani population. In order to save face, Iranians initiated another attempt to bring 
the parties around the negotiations table (Glebov, 1992).  
In 1992 second round of negotiations started. A meeting on the presidential level of the 
two countries took place and it was agreed to establish a ceasefire, end the economic 
blockade of Armenia, let international observers have access to the area, exchange 
prisoners and make a joint decision on the issue of refugees. The presidents agreed to 
these conditions, however, on the next day news came from Shushi, a city where 
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Azerbaijanis were holding the last position in NK, that Armenian forces have taken 
control of the city and are threatening Nakhchivan (an Azerbaijani-controlled territory 
on the East of Armenia bordering with Turkey). This meant that another attempt of 
negotiations was failed. As a result, the Iranian deputy of foreign relations publicly 
denounced this act as ‘’undisguised aggression’’ and declared that Iran considers NK as 
part of Azerbaijan and will not accept any change of borders in the region. Iranian 
authorities were scared of brake out of aggressive movements in the northern region of 
the country, hence at some point, the relations with Azerbaijan strengthened and ties 
with Armenia weakened. In 1993, Iranian President Rafsanjani, during his visit to Baku, 
announced that Iran will not provide Azerbaijan with military aid. However, they will 
not let Armenia advocate open aggression against Azerbaijan as well (Sharpe, 1995).  
Along with the above-mentioned incident during the negotiations, there were other 
reasons as well that made Iran step aside from the negotiations process. Factors such as 
pressure from Turkey and the United States, Azerbaijani ultra-nationalist, Pan-Turkic, 
and anti-Iranian elements made them keep a lower profile. However, this did not imply 
that Iran would not follow how further events evolve. As long as there is the issue of 
‘’South and North Azerbaijan’’ and security of its borders, Tehran will continue to keep 
an eye on this conflict (Minasyan, 2010).  
In order to have a better understanding of Armenian-Iranian alignment in the context of 
NK conflict, it is important to present some findings from the Armenian, Iranian and 
Russian media as well.  
As it has been already mentioned before, there is a significant amount of Turkish-
speaking Iranians –Azeris living in Iran. Azerbaijan still in the 1990s had presented 
territorial claims in order to establish its project of “Greater Azerbaijan”. Even though 
after Heydar Aliyev’s coming to power the issue has obtained more subtle character it is 
not ignored by the Iranian leaders. Moreover, according to some of the experts, it 
provides solid grounds to explain one of the reasons of alignment with Armenia. 
According to one article in Russian media in the light of this year’s Presidential 
Elections of Iran that will take place on May 19, 2017, the separatist mood in Iranian 
Azerbaijan region has grown. Azerbaijani National Resistance Organisation (ANRO) 
has addressed to the US President Donald Trump not to consider them as Iranians. They 
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mentioned that Iran has occupied their territories which led them to seek a home in 
Europe and the US for decades (Tarasov, 2017). This shows that even today, the threat 
to territorial integrity of Iran is as realistic as it was in the beginning of 1990s and 
Tehran should respond to it properly.     
Another Russian source analysing Armenian-Iranian relations in the light of NK conflict 
refers to the comments of the Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran 
Bahram Ghasemi on the trilateral meeting among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. 
Ghasemi states that the resolution of the NK conflict without taking into consideration 
the opinion of its people is impossible. The role of people will be of central value in the 
conflict regulation. This kind of announcement may be perceived as supporting the 
Armenian approach, however, at the time of the meeting with the Azerbaijani President 
Ilham Aliyev, President of Iran Hasan Rouhani mentioned that Iran has always 
supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. This kind of policy implemented by the 
Iranian government may be understood the following way. According to Lana Ravandi-
Fadai, an academician from the Centre of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies in 
Moscow, this might be Tehran’s reaction to the close relations developed with Israel 
and the US, fearing that the territory of Azerbaijan may be used for establishing a US 
military base and also, the West may play a card of common history between Iran and 
Azerbaijan and trigger Turkic nationalism for the unification with its Iranian Northern 
Azerbaijan. This led to Tehran’s support to Armenia in NK conflict as a counterbalance 
to Baku’s political choice (Tarasov, 2017).   
Along with leading this kind of policy, Iran has always announced that Armenia and 
Azerbaijan should be determined in the peaceful resolution of the NK conflict and not 
let third actors intervene and deepen the crisis. The minister of Defence Hossein 
Dehghan recently during the Azerbaijani Defence Minister’s official visit again 
highlighted the importance of this approach (Dehghan, 2017).  According to the Russian 
sources, the third party is not Russia, as given that Caucasus Republics were part of the 
Soviet Union, they fall under the region of Russian influence. The third parties here are 
Turkey and all the other external powers.  
Previous Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Makhson Pak Ayin, at the interview with 
the correspondent from the Russian Gorchakov Fund of Public Diplomacy, mentioned 
48 
 
that security is the main regional concern for Iran and they are interested in the 
preservation of peace in the region. From the Iranian perspective, the reason why the 
conflict is not solved is foreign intervention and lack of will for the conflict resolution, 
as that may lead to decreased dependence on external powers. Hence, Iranian side is 
convinced that in order to preserve the regional stability it is important that the regional 
countries build strong cooperation ties with one another. This way it will be possible to 
create strong regional cooperation and overcome the disagreements (Gadjiev, 2013).    
 Armenian journalist Gegham Baghdasaryan states that in 2011 Iranian Embassy in 
Armenia made two very important announcements that should be carefully analysed. 
First one refers to the peaceful settlement of the conflict based on international law and 
Iran’s willingness to contribute to it. Second, which is more interesting, is the fact that 
the official position of Iran regarding the foreign policy will be presented by the 
President of the IRI, Minister of the Foreign Affairs and the Spokesperson of the MFA. 
All the other approaches should be perceived as private opinions. This announcement 
followed the statement of the religious leader of Ardabil imam-juma ayatollah Seyed 
Hasan Ameli who stated that Iran has helped Azerbaijan during the NK conflict. He 
particularly mentioned that Iranian politicians do not refer to their help to Azerbaijan 
because of certain diplomatic reasons. However, as a religious leader, he has to say 
about it in order to give an answer to the questions and suspicions of their Muslim 
brothers. In his speech, he specifically mentions that generals from Tabriz and Ardabil 
have cooperated with each other and helped Azerbaijan to stop Armenian aggression. 
Besides, Iran also helped to bring thousand soldiers from Afghanistan that participated 
in the war (Baghdasaryan, 2010).    
This information is confirmed in Iranian media, particularly, in Raja news agency it is 
mentioned that the religious leader of Ardabil said that it is time to address the 
allegations from the Azeri population of Iran and Muslim world in general. Along with 
this, Iranian officials also mention that the NK conflict has turned into a leverage that is 
used by the external forces to put pressure on the engaged parties (Iranian Diplomacy, 
2008). Even though it is not directly mentioned what Iranian side implies by external 
parties, however, the context following this statement is about the US possible attack on 
Iran by using their alignment with the regional countries. This may let us assume that 
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Iranian politicians imply the US and Israeli alignment with Azerbaijan. In this context, 
another Iranian official Mohsen Rezaei, who is the secretary of the Expediency 
Discernment Council, stated that if the government of Azerbaijan prefers the 
cooperation with Israel over Iranian national interests, then they have to accept the fact 
that Nagorno-Karabakh will be forever gone (Mohamadzade, 2016). Of course, this 
kind of announcement caused anger among leaders who have a pro-Azerbaijani 
approach and was criticised, however, the reality is that Iranian leaders have taken into 
consideration Azerbaijani-Israeli-US cooperation and acted based on rational 
calculations.        
According to some experts, Iran has only one partner in the region – Armenia, and the 
announcement of the Ayatollah’s representative is aimed to exclude ex-President 
Ahmadinejad from the only partner in the region. Nevertheless, some sources in Baku 
also tried to deny these allegations, but an Azerbaijani newspaper “Eni Musavat” 
referred to an Azerbaijani general Sardar Gamidov who confirmed that there have been 
afghan fighters participating on the Azerbaijani side that was brought from Iran. This 
information has been confirmed by the previous Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan 
Rahim Gaziyev and by the Head of the Republican Islamic Party Gadji Nuriyev, who 
particularly mentioned that it is time to reveal the fact that Iran helped Azerbaijan in the 
NK conflict and without its help the damage would have been much bigger. An Azeri 
journalist and editor of the “Zerkalo” newspaper Rauf Mirkadyrov hold the position that 
Iranians say one thing in Armenia, another in Azerbaijan (Baghdasaryan, 2011). This 
entire piece illustrates what kind of balanced policy Iran tries to lead by on the one 
hand, trying to show the Muslim audience that they share solidarity with them, on the 
other hand, acting from the position that coincides with Armenia’s national interests. 
Previous Armenian Minister Seyran Ohanian has confirmed that during the Karabakh 
war there have been Afghan soldiers fighting on the Azerbaijani side, however, he did 
not refer to the issue that Iran had anything to do with them (Ohanyan, 2013). This is 
completely understandable because Armenian-Iranian relations are in such a positive 
phase now that there is no need to refer to that.  
In Armenian media, one can also see articles discussing what kind of crises situations 
Armenia and Iran have overcome. For instance, one of the CIVILNET sources mentions 
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that during the NK conflict, students from different Universities of Tehran have 
organised protests in front of the Armenian Embassy in Iran with slogans ''Go away 
Armenian fascism'', ''Go away occupiers'' etc and condemned the Armenian aggression 
and demanded to bring out Armenian forces from Karabakh. These demonstrations were 
accompanied by attacking the premises of the Embassy and attempt to break the gates. 
On the other hand, another incident happened when in March 1994, in the territory of 
NK an Iranian aeroplane flying from Moscow to Tehran carrying family members of 
Iranian embassy diplomats to Russia was hit. As a result of a mistake of Armenian 
forces around 40 people lost their lives. This created a crisis situation between Armenia 
and Iran (Hakobyan, 2016). As we see, there have been actions on both sides that from 
time to time have caused difficulties in bilateral relations. Yet, the stakes and benefits 
from the cooperation are so high that parties decided to focus on advantages that the 
collaboration offers rather than negative aspects.       
When the question of geopolitical interests towards Armenia is discussed in the Iranian 
media, there are two aspects that are made clear. First, they mention that Iran is not 
interested to see Turkey as a strong country in the region and as long as Armenia stands 
between Nakhichevan and Turkey in the West, and Iranian Azeris and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan on the East, the Turkish appetite for implementation of their Pan-Turkic 
project will not be satisfied. Second, is the factor of Armenian Diaspora and its strong 
lobby in the US and Europe. Iranian leaders believe that if they support Armenia in NK 
conflict then they can use the powerful Armenian Diaspora abroad in their own interests 
and open the closed doors for them (Yousefi, 2016).    
Armenian and Iranian Presidents had an official meeting in December 2016 during 
which a number of issues have been discussed including NK conflict. Apart from saying 
that Iran supports the peaceful resolution of the NK conflict based on the norms of the 
international law, Rouhani also has mentioned that Armenia and Iran should cooperate 
with each other in the regional security issues, particularly in Syria and Iraq. Rouhani 
has mentioned that Armenian and Iranian approaches in the international field basically 
coincide with each other and share the same approaches (Azatutyun Radiokayan, 2016). 
This is another proof that Iran highly values cooperation with Armenia in the 
geopolitics of the region in a wider sense.   
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Iran has suggested a number of times get re-involved in the negotiations process. The 
offer has been accepted by the Azerbaijanis side but Armenia has not given a final 
response to that yet. Not because Armenia has doubts in Iranian intentions, but it may 
mean change of the negotiations framework. In Armenian media and among experts the 
opinion that in NK conflict Iran supports the preservation of the status quo and the 
preservation of the current borders is highly circulated, as it stands between the 
Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkish speaking population of Iran. This implies that Iran 
does not support the return of any of the buffer territories around the NK to Azerbaijan 
and bringing peacekeeping forces to the region. In this sense, there is a question how 
Iranian-Russian interests contradict each other, as Russia basically agrees to the return 
of the territories to Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, it is not clear how Russia refers to the idea 
of bringing peacekeeping mission. One aspect that is clear is that will present more 
threat to Iran if those forces will be brought to its Northern border from the Azerbaijani 
side in case the control of territories will go back to Azerbaijan (Muradryan, 2010). This 
explains why Iran may be interested in getting involved in negotiations process so to 
build a different kind of political relations with Russia.  
 
3.2. Armenian-Iranian alignment in the context of NK conflict 
based on the academic sources and conducted interviews 
In order to be able to understand why Iran’s policy has a pro-Armenian profile, it is 
important to understand the context of Iran-Azerbaijan relations. From 1990-1994 the 
relations between Azerbaijan and Iran can be divided into three distinct phases. The first 
round, from 1990 to mid-1992 was a period of gradual strengthening of the ties between 
the two countries. However, between mid-1992 and mid-1993, relations suffered as 
Elchibey pursued a pro-Turkish policy and he was particularly well-known for his past 
speeches with the rhetoric of creating the ‘’Greater Azerbaijan’’ which included the 
northern region of Iran as well. Since mid-1993, Baku and Tehran improved their 
relations due to Aliyev’s balanced policy towards neighbouring countries. Even though 
Iran opened an embassy in Baku in 1992, the Iranian authorities had problems with 
competing with Turkey’s increasing influence in Azerbaijan (Sharpe, 1995).  
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The relatively long borders with Azerbaijan and Armenia made Iran adopt a policy that 
will not pose a threat to the conflict escalation and spilling over its own territory. 
Therefore, in contrast to its ideology-laced policy adopted towards the Middle East, Iran 
adopted a neutral position in NK conflict and did not support either of the parties even if 
Azerbaijan is a Shiite Majority country. There are approximately 15 million ethnic 
Azeris living in the north-west region of Iran named Aturpatakan (Atropatene) or in 
Farsi -Azerbaijan, which has nothing to do with the Republic of Azerbaijan (Mesamed, 
2013). Hence, Iran was worried that support for Azerbaijan against Armenia will 
provide a basis for the unification of the two “divided” regions that have been separated 
by the Persian and Ottoman Empires
11
.  
After all, as a result of Azerbaijan’s increased rhetoric for unification with “southern 
Azerbaijan”, the same as Iranian northern region Azerbaijan, Iran started to cooperate 
more closely with Armenia and as a result, parties signed a treaty of friendship and 
economic cooperation at the end of 1992. In 1992 also the embassy of IRI (Islamic 
Republic of Iran) was opened in Armenia, and at the end of the year, the Armenian 
Embassy in Tehran was opened (Mesamed, 2013). 
Another noteworthy point between Iranian-Azerbaijani relations that led Iran to adopt a 
policy that seems to be in Armenia’s favour is that in 1994 Azerbaijan offered 5% of 
Azerbaijani stake in the exploitation of the Caspian oil sea shelf to Tehran and they 
immediately accepted it because of pragmatic foreign policy and economic interests. 
However, this agreement was annulled by President Aliyev in 1995 under the US 
pressure and its new stakes in the Caspian basin oil projects. Iran’s initial response to 
this decision was verbal lash out at the Aliyev government, but afterwards, Iran decided 
to counter Azerbaijan’s actions by aligning itself with Russia and Armenia as Iran’s 
national economic interests were threatened by Azerbaijan’s pro-Western policy and 
rapprochement with the US (Gresh, 2006).   
                                                          
11
 The reason why “divided” is in brackets is that the Republic of Azerbaijan was established only in 
1918, and the choice of name “Azerbaijan” was not a coincidence. The name Azerbaijan has its roots in 
historical realm of Atropatakan (or Atropatene). The choice of the name Azerbaijan in 1918 angered the 
Persian government as they suspected that this will eventually lead to territorial claims by the 
Azerbaijani government (Swietokhowski, 1995).   
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At the same time, intense relations with Azerbaijan led Iran to adopt a cautious policy 
and support the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh in order to prevent further displacement 
of Azerbaijanis who might stir nationalistic sentiment and threaten the national 
sovereignty of Iran. Meanwhile, Iran’s support for Armenia insured the government of 
Iran that Armenia could remain strong enough to stave off a possible future armed 
conflict with Azerbaijan (Gresh, 2006).  
Pan-Islamic sentiment has been overlooked in Iranian foreign policy as the pragmatic 
calculation of national interests has played more important role in the case of alignment 
with Armenia. One aspect of that is the “Russian-centric” element in Iran’s policy 
toward Eurasia and Russia’s support for Armenia in NK conflict. In this sense, Tehran 
hopes that its support towards Armenia would prompt more positive attitude of Russia 
toward the Islamic Republic (Dorraj, 2013).  
Whatsoever, Iran officially kept neutrality in NK conflict also because they did not want 
to undermine Moscow’s role in the region and interfere in an issue that was perceived as 
an issue of Russian regional interests. If Iran increased the violence in the region, it 
would have ended up with external intervention, meaning bringing international troops 
close to Iran’s borders, either by Russia or NATO, neither of which was in Iran’s 
interests as it would lead to disturbance of the regional balance of power (Gresh, 2006). 
On the one hand, siding with Azerbaijan would produce a certain level of pressure from 
the rich upper Armenian elite in Iran. This could have been perceived also as a religious 
move and would have been internationally criticised.  On the other hand, Islamic 
government would not side with a Christian country against a Muslim republic. Hence, 
neutrality was the safest option (Papazian, 2001).   
Interviews conducted with the diplomats and analysts in Armenia revealed a number of 
important aspects of Iranian-Armenian relations in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. One of the Armenian diplomats and a former Ambassador, who preferred not 
to be named, sees the following distinct reasons for the Iranian interests in the peaceful 
and quick resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First and foremost, Azerbaijan 
was not against the Iranian involvement in the mediation process. Second, the conflict 
was on the Iranian border which presented a serious security threat to Iran, hence there 
was a need to act. Last but not least, there was a plan to construct a hydroelectric station 
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on Araks river which was interrupted because of the war and as a result, the 
construction was finished only in 2002. Moreover, in the context of Karabakh conflict, 
Iran tries to keep a balanced foreign policy. What is meant by that is that from time to 
time during the meetings with Azerbaijani officials Iran announces that they support the 
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. On the other hand, they mention that people’s right to 
self-determination is an important human right and should be respected at the time of 
the final resolution of the conflict.  This balance may be disrupted from time to time, 
but Iranian officials try to restore it
12
.  
Analyst and head of the Iranian Studies Department at the Yerevan State University, 
Vardan Voskanyan argues that Iranian approach towards Karabakh conflict has two 
layers – visible and invisible. On the visible side, on the diplomatic level Iranian 
approach is neutral. Yet, there have been periods when Iranian approach has included to 
some extent anti-Armenian approach as well. This refers especially to the period when 
Heydar Aliyev came to power and Iranians were expecting that Baku will support Iran, 
as when being the governor of Nakhchivan he had a pro-Iranian position. Nevertheless, 
after coming to power in Baku, Iranian expectations did not come true as Aliyev 
announced about “One nation two states” ideology, by that referring to Azerbaijan and 
Turkey. That is another factor why Iranian approach towards the Azerbaijan has 
changed. Thus, this is only about one episode, and in general, Iranian official position 
has always been neutral
13
. 
On the invisible side, Iranians are more interested in keeping the current border in the 
region of Meghri or at least, its change not in favour of Azerbaijan because the territory 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan is often used by foreign states to pose a threat to Iran. So, 
the shorter the border the lower is the possibility of threatening Iran in this context. In 
Azerbaijan the issue of creating a “united Azerbaijan” which will include the northern 
region of Iran where Azari (name of the language spoken in this region of Iran) 
speaking Iranians are living has been discussed on different levels. This issue obviously 
cannot be overlooked by Iran, as the population of the northern region of Iran very often 
                                                          
12
 Interview with an ex-Ambassador, April 4, 2017.  
13
 Interview with an Armenian Diplomat, April 10, 2017.  
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falls under the Azerbaijani propaganda coming from Baku. Therefore, in this context, it 
is clear that Iranians have distinct position towards NK conflict:  
1. Preserving the status quo in terms of borders.  
2. Stand against the idea of bringing peacekeeping mission to the region, as 
they avoid seeing military forces of third countries in their neighbourhood, even 
if they will be in the peace keeping framework.  
3. It is obvious that Armenia’s, including Artsakh, strong position in the 
region is also in Iranian interests, as it is an allying country and a serious 
barrier between the northern Turkic borders for Iran. Consequently, taken into 
account all these aspects, Iran has a pro-Armenian profile
14
. 
Benyamin Poghosyan, Executive Director at the Political Science Association of 
Armenia, claims that taking into consideration the strategic alliance between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan, Iran perceives Armenia as a significant partner in its policy to prevent the 
growing influence of Turkey in the region. This is one of the key reasons why Iran 
tacitly supports the current status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At the same time, 
friendly relations with Armenia allow Iran to reject accusations of pursuing mainly a 
religion-based foreign policy. Moreover, the membership of Armenia in the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) also provides Iran with a possibility to view Armenia as a 
launching pad for entering the EEU market that has 170 million population. The 
possible signature of an agreement on free trade area between the EEU and Iran, as well 
as Armenia's plans to establish a free economic zone near the Iranian border later this 
year makes Armenia a more important economic partner for Iran. Besides, Armenia is 
also an alternative transit route for Iran to link India and Europe through Georgian 
Black sea ports
15
.  
Mr Poghosyan also mentions that in NK conflict Iran is more interested in the 
preservation of status quo. “Given the fact that Iran is worried about the increase of 
Turkic elements in the region, it is not interested in changes in current borders. How this 
presents pro-Armenian position we can discuss from the perspective of the Armenian 
                                                          
14
 Interview with the Head of the Iranian Studies Department of YSU, April 5, 2017. 
15
 Interview with the Executive Director at the Political Science Association of Armenia, April 12, 2017.  
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national interests. If we claim that preservation of status quo is in Armenian interests, 
then we can also argue that Iran has pro-Armenian position”16.  
Mr Voskanyan states that Iran is a Shi’a country, and such a second country in the 
South Caucasus is Azerbaijan. Hence, on the ideological level, we can hear from 
different religious leaders, statements about cultural and historical commonalities of the 
two countries. At the same time, it should be taken into account that the context of those 
announcements is one: Iran, in a broader sense, is inclined to the establishment of the 
pro-Iranian government in Azerbaijan. From the Iranian perspective, it will be good for 
Iranians if that government will be pro-Islamic – almost the same that they have in Iran 
now, which will lead to consuming Azerbaijan into Iranian system. Iranians do not lead 
a policy directed to the division of the Azerbaijan. Instead, they tend to completely 
consume it
17
. From this perspective, it becomes clear that backing Christian Armenia is 
more in Iranian Interests, as Iran has more pragmatic reasons for that.  
Sergey Minasyan, the Deputy Director of the Caucasus Institute in Armenia, believes 
that Iran preserves neutrality given the fact that it is a Shia country and has a big 
number of Iranians of Turkic origin living in its territory. Armenia has good relations 
with Iran because of its closed borders and the isolated position. From this point, 
cooperation with Iran is not only beneficial from the NK conflict’s perspective but in 
general sense as well. Iran’s involvement in the negotiations process may add some 
mechanisms of trust in the process. However, it may also mean change of the OSCE 
Minks Group negotiations framework which is not in Armenia’s interests. Nevertheless, 
it should be also taken into account that the US is involved in the negotiations, which 
decreases the possibility of Iran being a party to it
18
.  
If we discuss the Iranian involvement in the mediation process, Mr Poghosyan states 
that the possibility for Iran to get involved in mediation mission is minimum. In his 
opinion, those announcements are mainly meant to show that they are a part of the 
ongoing developments in the region and are not isolated. Besides, as the official 
Armenian approach is to keep the framework of the OSCE Minsk group and there is no 
question of doubting the functionality of the chosen framework, Mr Poghosyan adds: I 
                                                          
16
 Ibid, April 12, 2017.  
17
 Interview with the Head of the Iranian Studies Department, April 5, 2017.  
18
 Interview with the Deputy Director of the Caucasus Institute, April 6, 2017.  
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don’t think that Iranian mediation is possible as changing the framework is not in 
Armenia’s interests. We know that Azerbaijan tries to change the framework. Finally, I 
do not believe that Iran may suggest something new for the conflict resolution, as 
started from 1997 all the configurations have been suggested
19
.   
Head of the Regional Studies Centre (RSC), an independent think tank in Armenia, 
Richard Giragosian disagrees with the general assumption that Iran favours Armenia in 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It could be argued by the Azerbaijani side that Iran is in 
favour of Armenia. In other words, the fact that Iran is not backing fellow Shia Muslim 
country despite the neutrality means that it is seen as pro-Armenian
20
. When discussing 
the issue of Iran’s involvement in the negotiations process, then Mr Giragosian believes 
that “Iran is a vested actor and in many ways should be more included in the peace 
process. Much of the resistance prior to the nuclear deal has led to the Western 
opposition. However, there have been several times during the 1990s where even the 
US was briefing the Iranian government on the Minsk Group peace process which was 
an element of recognising Iran as a potentially positive stakeholder in post-conflict 
stability”21. Finally, Mr Giragosian concludes that Iran’s involvement in the 
negotiations process does not mean that it may be used by Azerbaijan to bring Turkey in 
as it is already a member of the OSCE, even if it is not an active one. However, he 
believes that Iran may still bring a positive change to the negotiations process.   
Another Armenian diplomat mentioned during the interview that when speaking about 
the Armenian-Iranian relations and the NK conflict, a very important aspect is to take 
into account the ethnic origin of the official representative speaking about those 
relations. If the politician is an ethnic Azeri, he will show his support towards the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. Officials of the medium and low profiles from time to time 
mention this fact, whereas high level ethnic Azeri officials do not speak about it in order 
to avoid scandals. After all, when analysing actions of some of those officials, they try 
to disturb Armenian-Iranian good relations. Such example can be protests organised by 
Azeris in 1992-94. A more recent example is the organised protests in Tabriz during the 
four-day war between Azerbaijan and NK forces in 2016. Protests of Azeris living in 
                                                          
19
 Interview with the Executive Director at the Political Science Association of Armenia, April 12, 2017. 
20
 Interview with the Head of the Regional Studies Centre, April 12, 2017.  
21
 Ibid, April 12, 2017.  
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Tehran did not take place as a result of the serious measures implemented by the Iranian 
government
22
.  
To sum up this part, a couple of aspects should be made clear. The multidimensional 
analysis of Armenian, Russian and Iranian media articles along with the academic 
sources and expert views contribute to the construction of the image that Iran supports 
Armenia instead of backing up Azerbaijan in NK conflict. So, the answer to the 
question how they do it can be reflected in several aspects. First, the preservation of the 
status quo is in Iranian interests, as it will mean there will be no change in the borders. 
There is a buffer zone between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Northern Iranian 
Azerbaijan region which eliminates the Azerbaijani nationalistic threat. Second, a 
number of sources mention that Armenia is Iran’s only partner in the region, as they do 
not have any problematic aspects in terms of cooperation and presenting a threat to one 
another, whereas the fact that Azerbaijan cooperates with the US and Israel, is perceived 
as a serious threat to Iranian national interests.  Third, Iran does not want to see Turkey 
as a powerful country in the region, therefore, as long as the relations between Armenia 
and Turkey are not normalised, Turkey does not have a chance to achieve that. All these 
factors contribute to the construction of the perception that in NK conflict Iran has 
adopted a pro-Armenian approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Interview with an Armenian Diplomat, April 11, 2017.  
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Conclusion 
To summarise all the findings it should be noted that this thesis has analysed the 
Armenian-Iranian alignment in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The 
research question was: “Why Iran has taken a strategic position that is in favour of 
Armenia in Karabakh conflict although alliance theory would have predicted something 
different”?   
First and foremost, it was made clear that in Armenian-Iranian case it is better to use the 
term alignment rather than an alliance because alliances mostly refer to the military 
formulations and usually put a certain obligation on the members in terms of 
cooperation with other states. Whereas alignment is a more general term that includes 
the political, geostrategic and economic dimension of cooperation, it is not limited to 
only military cooperation, and most importantly, does not put limitations on engaged 
parties in terms of cooperation with other states or organisations under which 
Armenian-Iranian case fits.  
Second, the analysis of Realist/Neorealist and Constructivist approaches of alliance 
theory showed that both Realist and Neorealist scholars perceive the establishment of 
alignments as a result of threat perception and need to response to that threat. Besides, 
while Neorealist scholars argue that state interests are stable and they never change, 
Constructivist scholars argue that state interests are not stable, they change and can be 
constructed in accordance with the national interests of the state and presented 
challenges of the given time period.  
Third, the contrast and comparison of National Security Strategies of Iran and Armenia, 
different analysis on the construction of interests of both states along with the conducted 
interviews showed that if in Armenia’s case the cooperation with Iran is a basic need 
given the geographical isolation and economic difficulties, Iran is a pragmatic country 
and acts based on its own national interests and rational calculations. Therefore, even if 
the Realist approach of alliance theory would have predicted that it is more realistic for 
Iran backup Azerbaijan, a Shia Muslim country, in the context of Karabakh conflict, the 
Constructivist approach has the capacity to explain how Iranian national interests are 
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constructed, hence resulted the impression that Iran has a pro-Armenian rather than a 
pro-Azerbaijani profile. 
Even though history is an important factor in the development of bilateral relations 
between Armenia and Iran, it should be made clear that for the current state of relations 
the latter does not play an essential role and must not be overestimated. It serves as a 
basis for those relations, but it is geopolitics and pragmatic Iranian policy rather than 
history that has a decisive role in this alignment.  
In Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Iran officially has a neutral position and in practice leads 
balanced policy. What is meant by the balanced policy is that when having meetings 
with Azerbaijani officials, Iranian leaders mention that they support the territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan which includes the NK as well, whereas at the time of meetings 
with Armenian counterparts they mention about the importance of peoples’ rights to 
self-determination. Meanwhile, the general perception is that Iran has a position that is 
more in favour of Armenia than Azerbaijan. It should be made clear what is meant by 
“in favour of Armenia” statement because if Iran has a position that coincides with 
Armenian interests in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it still does not imply that Iran 
supports the Armenian version of Karabakh conflict’s resolution. 
 The rational calculations and pragmatic approach are visible most vividly, at least, in 
two aspects. First, any incident that may pose a threat to the territorial integrity of Iran 
is perceived as a security threat. Iran was worried that the Azerbaijani propaganda in the 
context of creating “Great Azerbaijan” may trigger separatist movements among the 
significant number of Azeri population living in its North-western region that is why 
officially they have adopted a neutral position towards the NK conflict. At the same 
time, from time to time Iranian leaders support the idea of peoples’ rights to self-
determination and seem to have pro-Armenian profile in order to make clear for 
Azerbaijan that they need to be cautious in their relation with the US and Israel that may 
use the Azerbaijani territory and pose a threat to the Iranian security.       
 Furthermore, alignment with Armenia and its strong position in the region is a 
counterbalance to the rise of Turkic elements on the Iranian borders. The anti-Turkic 
sentiments in Iran have deep roots which have been reflected even in the famous Iranian 
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epic poem Shahnameh, where the Iran-Turan rivalry is the main topic of discussion. 
Consequently, given the historical rivalry of those two forces, it is understandable that 
the rise of Turkic factors is not in Iranian national interests nowadays as well and as 
long as Armenia is between those actors and Iran, they are secured.  
The analysis of different media articles, academic sources and expert views shows that 
they also contributes to the construction that in NK conflict Iran has a pro-Armenian 
profile by highlighting issues such as nationalistic sentiments towards the Iranian 
Azerbaijan, the threat to the territorial integrity of Iran, Azerbaijan’s pro-Western policy 
and cooperation with Israel, Iran’s position towards the rise of the Turkey’s role in the 
region and some other aspects.   
Additionally, alignment with a Christian country shows the international community 
that Iranian foreign policy is not only religion based, but rather value based, as 
Armenian-Iranian case can be one of the best examples of dialogue between two major 
religions: the first Christian country and the only Islamic theocracy of its kind. This 
decreases the level of criticism addressed towards Iran from the western countries.  
Finally, even though geopolitics and security play a more decisive role in Armenian-
Iranian alignment, the cooperation in economic, transport, tourism and energy sectors 
are also important. For Armenia, Iran offers a big market to export its goods and boost 
economy, while for Iran, Armenia is a way connecting it with the external world given 
the atmosphere of international sanctions.   
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